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INTRODUCTION
No inquiry is more central to constitutional jurisprudence than the
effort to delineate the duties of government. The courts' approach to
this complex subject has been dominated by reliance on a simple dis-
tinction between affirmative and negative responsibilities. Govern-
ment is held solely to what courts characterize as a negative
obligation: to refrain from acts that deprive citizens of protected
rights. Obligations that courts conceive to be affirmative - duties to
act, to provide, or to protect - are not enforceable constitutional
rights. 1
This austere conception of the role of government is not new; it has
a lengthy pedigree.2 Recently, the Supreme Court has demonstrated
its continuing loyalty to the conception, in contexts which vividly il-
lustrate its flesh and blood consequences. In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 3 the Court left remediless the
mother of a boy who had been beaten so severely he will require insti-
tutionalization for the rest of his life, despite an avoidable governmen-
tal failure to prevent the harm. In Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,4 the Court upheld restrictions which will make abortions dif-
ficult or impossible for poor women to obtain. In both contexts the
Court refused to hold that a governmental duty had been breached, on
the ground that the Constitution does not impose affirmative obliga-
1. Professor Martha Minow has insightfully described the parallel between the Court's own
refusal to protect and that which it condones on the part of government. See Martha Minow,
Law and Violence (unpublished speech presented at the Harvard Medical School Continuing
Education 5th Annual Conference on Abuse and Victimization in Life-Span Perspective, Mar.
24, 1989) (transcript on file at the Harvard Law School Library).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 199-246.
3. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
4. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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tions on government. 5
In these and other cases, the powerful talismanic quality of certain
phrases is striking. The due process clause grants no affirmative
rights. 6 Governmental inaction is not actionable. 7 The Constitution is
a charter of negative liberties.8 These phrases signal the end of discus-
sion about constitutional protections. A conclusion has been reached
and no further reasoning is necessary. Yet when a conclusory incanta-
tion permits so many harms to flourish unchecked by the Constitution,
it should send the opposite signal: that the language, and the concepts
it describes, must be scrutinized with care. This article undertakes
that scrutiny.
Part I describes the current approach, which demands adherence
to the notion of a negative constitution. Part II critiques the assump-
tions underlying the current approach and demonstrates its undesir-
able consequences in decisional law. Part III explores the tenacious
barriers to recognition of affirmative governmental duties: the consti-
tutional, philosophical, and common law roots of the notion of a nega-
tive constitution, as well as the belief that recognizing affirmative
duties would be an invitation to chaos. Finally, Part IV proposes dis-
carding the rhetoric of negative rights and suggests an approach for
constructing a theory better designed to effectuate constitutional goals.
I. THE CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES: THE
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Traditionally, the protections of the Constitution have been viewed
largely as prohibitory constraints on the power of government, rather
than affirmative duties with which government must comply.9
Although scholars have long challenged this view,' 0 the courts have
steadfastly adhered to it. Once a claim on government is cast as a
request that it engage in, rather than refrain from, a particular activ-
ity, its dismissal is ordained. This Part seeks simply to describe the
prevailing conception of the Constitution as solely a charter of nega-
5. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3051.
6. See, eg., DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3051.
7. See, eg., City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1208 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
8. See, eg., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th
Cir. 1987), affd., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.
1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
9. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1984); Laurence Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun-
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 330, 331 (1985); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAs L. REv. 1363, 1392 (1984).
10. See, eg., articles cited infra note 20.
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tive liberties; Pirt II will demonstrate the flaws in its central
distinction.
The conventional wisdom distinguishes between negative rights to
be free from governmental interference and positive rights to have gov-
ernment do or provide various things. 1 The conventional wisdom is
that the Constitution recognizes 12 only the former. Individuals have
no right to have government do anything at all; it must only refrain
from harming or coercing them.
This sweeping statement encompasses a broad spectrum of possible
claims against the government. At one end of the spectrum are nar-
row claims that particular government officials violated specific duties
to known individuals. In its pure form, the conventional wisdom dis-
claims such duties. For example, in Gilmore v. Buckley, 13 the First
Circuit found no liability when state officials released a dangerous
mental patient they knew had threatened a specific individual, without
warning the individual, leading to her murder the next day. In Archie
v. City of Racine, 14 the Seventh Circuit upheld dismissal of a claim
against a 911 dispatcher who gave incorrect advice and erroneously
failed to dispatch an ambulance for a caller who then died.
According to the conventional wisdom, rejection of these claims
follows from rejection of broader claims for government services. The
conventional view holds that citizens have no constitutional right to
government services. Government need not establish police 5 or fire
departments; 16 it need not provide medical 17 or social services. From
this premise follows another: that the greater includes the lesser.1 8
11. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1392.
12. Or claims to recognize; such a simplistic distinction is of course impossible to implement
perfectly. See infra text accompanying notes 24-29 and 50-55.
13. 787 F.2d 714 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
14. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
15. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984).
16. Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1222.
18. The greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine views services as gratuitous privileges which gov-
ernment chooses to provide, and reasons that the greater power to withhold a benefit includes the
lesser power to grant it with conditions. The doctrine was widely used in the nineteenth century.
In its pristine form, the doctrine held that since the greater always includes the lesser, if a man
has an absolute right to do a thing (eg., stop dealing with his employer at will) he may qualify
the exercise of that right by agreeing to relinquish it on condition. That this condition is, or even
is intended to be, injurious to a third person is immaterial, for the court cannot inquire into the
intention with which a lawful act is done. See G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140 (1918) (citing Allen v. Flood, App.
Cas. 1 (1898)). Current jurisprudence assumes that the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine is
limited by the constraints of the Constitution. Thus it is subservient to the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and may not be used to permit
government to withhold services based on impermissible factors such as race, Yick Wo v. Hop-
2274 [Vol. 88:2271
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Because government has no duty to provide services, if it chooses to
provide them, it need not do so competently.1 9
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago Department
of Social Services, rejecting a due process claim 20 against a social ser-
vice agency which negligently failed to protect a child from a brutal
beating which infficted irreversible injury, explains and reaffirms the
conventional thinking about government duty to provide competent
services:
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.
It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property
without "due process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended
to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those in-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But reconciling the greater-includes-the-lesser and unconstitutional
conditions doctrines may not be so easy. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1458 (1989). See generally Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175-345 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 159-67.
19. Much of the articulation of this view has occurred in the courts of appeals. Based on this
reasoning, in Jackson v. City of Joliet the court refused to hold police liable when, in the course
of observing a burning car, they made no attempt to determine whether it was occupied or to call
an ambulance, and two people, one six-months pregnant, died in the car. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). In Jackson v. Byrne, police during a firefighters' strike
barred firefighters from gaining access to a firehouse though a fire had broken out directly across
the street. Two children died. The court refused to find governmental liability, reasoning that
the Constitution creates no positive entitlement to fire protection. 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir.
1984). In Bowers v. DeVito, mental health officiais released a patient who had killed before, and
was known to be dangerous, and he killed again. The court held that "there is no constitutional
right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen." 686 F.2d
616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
In particular, Judges Posner and Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit have been zealous sup-
porters of this view. See, eg., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easter-
brook, J.; Posner, J., concurring); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Posner, J.);
Bowers, 686 F.2d at 616 (Posner, J.); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors,
Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (arguing that imposing liability for failure to rescue would be economi-
cally inefficient).
20. When the courts speak of the Constitution as a charter of negative rights, the discussion
in defense of this proposition often proves to be solely concerned with due process. See, eg.,
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983). Many scholars arguing that the
Constitution contains affirmative rights have focused on the due process clause, often in conjunc-
tion with the equal protection clause. See, eg., Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the
Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 407 (1966) (arguing for a governmental duty of minimum pro-
tection); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966) (same); Frank
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) (same). However, the arguments for posi-
tive rights are by no means confined to this approach. See Kreimer, supra note 9 (arguing that
given pervasive government regulation, negative rights concept is inadequate); Arthur Selwyn
Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. CT. Rav. 199 (argument for positive
rights from structure and purpose of Constitution as a whole); Laurence Tribe, Unraveling Na-
tional League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977) (argument for affirmative rights from Usery decision);
Tushnet, supra note 9 (agreeing that present balance of positive and negative rights is askew, but
arguing that entire rights rhetoric should be abandoned).
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terests do not come to harm through other means. Nor does history
support such an expansive reading of the constitutional text.... [The
purpose of the Clause] was to protect the people from the State, not to
ensure that the State protected them from each other. The Framers were
content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area
to the democratic political process.
Consistent with these principles, our cases have recognized that the
Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmen-
tal aid .... If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to
provide its citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the
State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have
been averted had it chosen to provide them.21
Finally, at the far end of the spectrum are broad claims that gov-
ernment must provide food to the starving, jobs to the unemployed. If
courts are unwilling to recognize governmental duties toward specific
endangered individuals, or duties by government agencies and employ-
ees to meet their job descriptions, then broadly worded claims for min-
imum subsistence seem doomed to failure. In their most utopian
form, these claims are made only by scholars22 or by judges warning
that they are the inevitable result of embarking on the slippery slope of
requiring governmental duties.23
If claims for minimum subsistence, or even increased police and
fire protection, are the feared result, application of the conventional
wisdom is thought to keep the courts off the slippery slope entirely.
Like most legal constructs, however, the conventional wisdom rarely
exists in its pure form. This is not to underestimate the power of the
construct, which is considerable. Nevertheless, courts have often per-
mitted liability for what might be classified as governmental inaction.
Some constitutional provisions clearly mandate affirmative govern-
mental conduct. For example, the sixth amendment requires govern-
ment to provide an accused a speedy public trial, compulsory process,
assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to be informed of the nature
of the accusation and confronted with the witnesses against him.24
The equal protection clause requires that government sometimes take
affirmative steps to ensure that certain groups are not treated un-
equally;25 and has been held to mandate government provision of
21. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04 (1989).
22. See, eg., Bendich, supra note 20 (arguing for a governmental duty of minimum protec-
tion); Cox, supra note 20 (same); Michelman, supra note 20 (same).
23. See, eg., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Archie v. City
of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 309-27.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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goods and services which individuals would otherwise be denied be-
cause of their poverty.26 The conventional wisdom views these guar-
antees as aberrations; exceptions which prove the rule.27 It asserts
that their language contrasts with the negative phrasing elsewhere in
the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the sixth amendment's affirmative pro-
tections are made necessary by its peculiar context: the government's
initial deprivation of liberty.28 Likewise, the equal protection clause
simply says that once government has acted, either on behalf of a cer-
tain group, or to place a certain group at a disadvantage, it must en-
sure that its acts have not created an invidious inequality.29
It is difficult to distill a rule from these cases independent of the
requisites of particular constitutional provisions. It would not be a
correct characterization to say that once government has acted, it
must act competently, or fairly, or continue to act at all. The public
services cases have flatly rejected this formulation. 30 It is more accu-
rate to describe the rule as saying that once government has acted to
place a person in danger, it must protect him from that danger. Thus
in White v. Rochford,31 where police arrested the driver of a car and
left the remaining passengers, two young children, in the car alone on
a busy highway, the Seventh Circuit found liability. In situations
where a plaintiff is in custody, or has been involuntarily committed,
the courts more willingly find a duty to protect.32 In cases in which
the state is viewed as having done nothing to cause or worsen the
plaintiff's situation, though it is aware of a danger to her which it
could easily prevent, the courts are generally unwilling to find
26. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to divorce); Douglas v.,
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (attorney for .appeal of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19
(1956) (trial transcript).
27. Of course, even rights which are phrased in the affirmative can be narrowly construed,
and the Rehnquist Court's antipathy for governmental duties is evident even in regard to the
rights whose affirmative nature is textually obvious. See, eg., Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct.
2765 (1989) (no constitutional right to appointment of counsel for collateral appeals for indigent
prisoner in capital cases); United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989) (sixth amendment
not violated by government confiscation of accused's assets before trial though effect would be to
prevent defendant from paying for an attorney); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 109
S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (approving drug testing of railway workers after accidents); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (fourth amendment not violated by drug
testing of customs workers despite lack of individualized suspicion); Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.
1060 (1989) (federal court may not hear habeas petition presenting claim of a new constitutional
right, except in rare instances when that right, if recognized, would be applied retroactively).
28. David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 864, 873
(1986).
29. See id. at 880.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 294-99.
31. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
32. See, eg., DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Es-




Consistent with a burgeoning trend in tort law,34 courts, prior to
the DeShaney decision, carved out an exception to the rule against
affirmative duties when a special relationship was found to exist be-
tween the government and the injured party, such that government
officials had undertaken to assist or protect particular individuals or
classes. 35 However, the DeShaney holding seems to invalidate this ap-
proach, by holding that the only special relationship the Court recog-
nizes is that between a custodian and a person in custody, and that it
arises solely from the government's act of placing the person in danger
or otherwise restraining his liberty.36
In short, the conventional wisdom rests on the efficacy of the dis-
tinction between government action and inaction. Government has no
obligation to act, except, in limited circumstances, to ensure that no
harm is caused by its previous actions. In order to make the distinc-
tion between action and inaction, it becomes crucial to determine what
constitutes a governmental act, to distinguish the acts of government
from those of private persons, and to delineate the circumstances in
which the government has caused harm. Therefore, the distinction
between action and inaction reappears in other forms: the public/pri-
vate distinction; the penalty/subsidy distinction; and the rules of cau-
sation. Part II examines the application of the action/inaction
distinction in its various forms, and seeks to demonstrate that it is
unworkable and misguided.
II. THE CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES: THE FLAWED
NATURE OF THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The conventional wisdom about governmental duties reflects an
unfaltering belief in the rightness of certain distinctions. Moreover, it
33. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (no liability where 911
dispatcher gave wrong advice to ill caller and erroneously failed to dispatch an ambulance, and
caller then died), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir.)
(no liability where state knew of threat to specific individual yet released dangerous mental pa-
tient who murdered her the next day), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Ellsworth v. City of
Racine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985) (no liability when police who were protecting a witness
failed to do so adequately, resulting in attack); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 (1965). But see Doe v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981)
(liability where foster parent's abuse of child permitted by state agency's failure to monitor home
adequately); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-24; 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.7 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1 1990).
35. See Note, Defining the Scope of the Due Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit
Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith Immunity, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 948-64 (1985).
36. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
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displays great faith in the ability of language to capture those distinc-
tions.37 Its method is to classify claims about governmental obliga-
tions according to a simple either-or system. Is the government being
asked to act or to refrain from acting? To protect from the acts of
private parties or from its own wrongful acts? To afford positive, af-
firmative rights or negative rights? If the former, relief is denied.
In short, major issues about the scope of constitutional protection
are resolved by reference to a series of highly rigid and conceptualistic
distinctions 38 which exalt negative over positive rights, and hold that,
for government, only action is actionable. The purpose of this Part is
to take a close look at these distinctions which the courts vest with
such tremendous power. Section II.A argues that the distinction be-
tween action and inaction is far too arbitrary and simplistic to describe
the complex web of acts and omissions through which government
conducts its business. Sections II.B and II.C examines in detail two
variations on the distinction between action and inaction: the public/
private distinction, with particular attention to its misuse in the
DeShaney decision; and the penalty/subsidy distinction, in the context
of the abortion funding cases, most recently Webster v. Reproductive
Services. My goal is to demonstrate that the Court has relied on con-
clusory labels about negative and positive rights instead of articulat-
ing, in a principled fashion, the difficult value choices these cases
require.
A. The Disappearing Distinction Between Government
Action and Inaction
In the conventional wisdom, positive rights are rights to have gov-
ernment do or provide something. Negative rights are rights to have
government refrain from doing something. In cases as diverse as
DeShaney and Webster, the Court has labeled the plaintiff's complaint
as a claim for positive rights, or government action, and dismissed it
with little additional analysis. Are the spheres of positive and nega-
tive, inaction and action, so self-contained that this complacency is
justified?
The definitional difficulties in distinguishing action from inaction
are manifold. It would be overstating the case slightly to say that the
37. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 35-36 (1987).
38. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1014-18 (description of conceptualism as a belief
that concepts at a high level of generality and abstractness correspond to elements of the real




distinction is a useless one. It describes a common perception to say
that a police officer who beats a suspect has acted, whereas a police
officer who has decided not to interrupt his lunch break to aid an en-
dangered citizen has not acted. However, the description alone cannot
be used to determine the scope of constitutional protections: that de-
termination requires a number of value choices. I argue in this section
not that words like inaction and action should be stricken from the
language, but that the distinction they describe is incapable of applica-
tion without value choices, and ultimately is incapable of serving the
purposes for which it is employed. It cannot itself justify the choices
about government responsibility which are made in its name.
The term "act" is not self-defining. In fact, it is impossible to de-
fine without an understanding of the particular purpose for which the
term is to be used. For example, an act could be defined, as it often is
in common usage, as a voluntary physical movement, or a "'willed
muscular contraction.' -39 Yet this definition is both atomistic and na-
ive. It is atomistic in that it defines conduct as an isolated event apart
from its effects on others. It is naive because it is simplistic and rests
on unimportant differences. As Professor George Fletcher observes:
"Conscious non-motion is a greater assertion of personality than cas-
ual acting. One can only be puzzled by the widespread belief that the
distinction between motion and non-motion is of importance to the
law.,,40
Whether one has acted might be defined by state of mind, so that a
conscious decision to pursue or not pursue a certain course of conduct
would qualify. For example, an act could be defined as an "external
manifestation of the will." 41 Using this definition, such consciously
caused harm as a deliberate refusal to make an elevator available to
people attempting to escape from a mine would be classified as an act,
though it lacks a physical component. 42
What is apparent from attempts to focus on either physical or
state-of-mind criteria is that it is difficult to consider the act apart
from those whom it might affect, that is, apart from the harm it
caused, was meant to cause, or was likely to cause. The law some-
times chooses to focus on the act apart from its consequences, as with
39. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4.1, at 421 (1978).
40. Id. at 421-22.
41. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 252 n.24 (1980).
42. Id.
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strict liability,4 3 or attempt, 44 and more often chooses to focus on the
act in relation to its consequences. 45 Which approach is chosen is a
function of policy choices about duty, causation, fault, and remedy,
not of the mechanical application of a definition of the term "act."
The definition of an act is also dependent on the way its scope is
delineated. That is, whether a defendant has "acted" in the eyes of the
law depends largely on how far back in the chain of events the court is
willing to look.46 In Prosser's well-known example of the difficulty of
distinguishing action from inaction, "[flailure to blow a whistle or to
shut off steam, although in itself inaction, is readily treated as negli-
gent operation of a train, which is affirmative misconduct." 47 As this
example illustrates, if a defendant has set a dangerous instrumentality
in motion, the law must determine whether he should be liable for the
consequences, though he has done nothing additional which could be
classified as an immediate cause of harm.48
Perhaps it is common ground that the distinction between action
and inaction is malleable. Even Judge Easterbrook, a zealous oppo-
nent of requiring affirmative duties, admits that "it is possible to re-
state most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect, and
to show that inaction may have the same effects as a forbidden ac-
tion." 49 Especially in light of their fluidity, the question should be
why these distinctions are important; what purpose they are meant to
43. See, eg., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFOR-
MAT1ON OF TORT LAW 51-53 (1980) (arguing that strict liability is preferable to negligence the-
ory in tort law).
44. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 3.3.4.
45. See id, at § 6.4, at 420-46, § 8.2.1, at 588-93 (meaning of "act" in criminal law).
46. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 253-55; see also infra text accompanying note 337 (same point
in context of causation).
47. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at
374 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
48. See, eg., F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 719-22.
49. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct.
1338 (1989). A few lower court cases, including Archie itself, illustrate the correctness of his
observation. In White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382-83 (7th Cir. 1979), the majority found the
police liable because they had abandoned children on the highway and deprived them of adult
protection. The dissent objected that the police had done nothing to the children themselves: it
was not the children but their uncle whom the police took into custody. The officers simply
failed to take affirmative steps to protect them. 592 F.2d at 390 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). In
Archie, 847 F.2d at 1214-20, a 911 dispatcher gave an ill caller incorrect medical advice and
failed to send an ambulance. The majority construed this as a mere failure to send rescue serv-
ices. The government did not "act" because it neither caused the illness nor interfered with the
caller's ability to seek other medical help. The dissent argued that the defendant had affirma-
tively discouraged the caller from seeking other medical assistance. 847 F.2d at 1228-29 (Ripple,
J., dissenting). In Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the department of
mental health released a dangerous schizophrenic who then killed someone, the court construed
the suit as a claim for state protective services, though the state's affirmative act of releasing the
patient was obviously at issue.
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serve. In the context of this discussion, the question is what the dis-
tinctions are asked to accomplish in the constitutional realm.
In constitutional law, the relevant question is whether the govern-
ment has violated protected rights. The conventional wisdom holds
that government cannot be held liable for its failure to act, but only for
its affirmative acts, making it necessary to determine what constitutes
an affirmative governmental act. In the governmental context, draw-
ing a line between action and inaction is particularly problematic.
First, the determination of governmental liability under the Con-
stitution must begin with its provisions, which rarely allow for a neat
division between action and inaction. Even those constitutional duties
which are most clearly phrased in the negative may be enforceable
only through affirmative governmental exertions.50 The first amend-
ment exhorts only that "Congress shall make no law," but it has been
obvious for some time that the mere failure to pass laws restricting
speech will not relieve government of its responsibility for protecting
the freedom of speech. Government may be required to take affirma-
tive steps and allocate resources to ensure public access to forums and
information. 5' It can be argued persuasively that the purpose of the
fourth amendment was to keep government out of people's private af-
fairs,52 but enforcement of the protections against unreasonable search
and seizure depend on the government's observance of affirmative du-
ties to obtain warrants based on probable cause. The fifth amendment
also speaks in terms of freedom from government coercion: "No per-
son.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. '5 3 Yet the Court correctly has recognized that to prevent this
compulsion effectively, the government must take the affirmative step
of warning the accused of their rights. 54 Although some members of
the Rehnquist court disparage the Miranda warnings on the ground
that they are not mandated by the fifth amendment, but are merely a
way of enforcing it,55 the elusiveness of this distinction is precisely the
50. As discussed earlier, many constitutional duties are phrased in the affirmative, a state of
affairs which the conventional wisdom explains as anomalous. See supra text accompanying
notes 24-29.
51. See, eg., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (city must expend resources to clean up
litter rather than deny leafletters access to a public forum); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 763-
64 (10th Cir. 1951) (police have duty to protect speakers from mob action). Tribe notes that
Professor Zechariah Chafee first identified the need for affirmative government action to facilitate
expression in 1941. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-25, at 998 (2d
ed. 1988).
52. See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 395-409 (1974).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654
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point. Once it has been observed that some of the Bill of Rights is
phrased in terms of positive commands 56 and some in terms of nega-
tive exhortations, the task of interpreting the guarantees remains. The
scope of the fights, and the means of enforcing them, must be
ascertained.
Second, the distinction between action and inaction fails to reflect
the distribution of power and the ways in which government can cause
harm in the modem welfare state. In the words of Professor Seth
Kreimer:
[T]he conception of negative rights as freedom from coercive violence
has questionable value in shaping constitutional restraints on a govern-
ment that more often exerts its power by withholding benefits than by
threatening bodily harm .... The greatest force of a modem govern-
ment lies in its power to regulate access to scarce resources. 57
The assumption that government can deprive individuals of protected
rights only by its actions does not take into account government's per-
vasive influence through regulatory action and inaction,58 its displace-
ment of private remedies, and, indeed, its monopoly over some
avenues of relief.59
Government can harm by its inertia. When an individual fails to
act, perhaps he harms only himself.60 Like a dangerous instrumental-
ity set in motion, when government fails to act, its momentum contin-
ues. It keeps collecting taxes; its employees continue to perform their
jobs; its directives continue in force. In short, the bureaucracy contin-
ues to function. How it functions, whether it spends its money wisely,
whether it promulgates rules, abides by them, or discards those which
need to be discarded, whether it supervises its employees and disci-
(1984), and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985). For a
discussion of the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional common
law, see Henry Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975). But see Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Recon-
sidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1117 (1978) (discussing dangers of
assigning Miranda rules subconstitutional status).
56. See, eg., the sixth amendment protections, supra text accompanying note 24.
57. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1295-96.
58. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1451.
59. See, eg., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state monopoly over avenues for
obtaining a divorce led to invalidation of requirement for payment of court fees); see also Sulli-
van, supra note 18, at 1451 (government has a monopoly on legitimate violence); Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 189,
194-96, (1989) (government has monopoly over highways).
60. Whether he causes harm will depend on the definition of harm, which is linked to the
question of duty. For example, if under modern tort principles he has a duty to rescue under
certain circumstances, he will harm those he fails to rescue when those circumstances obtain.
See infra text accompanying notes 338-39. Under most circumstances, this will not be a large




plines them when necessary, all depend on a continuing series of
choices. Whether these are choices in favor of action or inaction, they
will have consequences, and in either case the consequences may cause
harm.61
Government can harm by its inaction and its inadequate action, as
well as its direct action. Government can cause harm by failing to
promulgate and enforce rules62 and failing to supervise. 63 It can harm
by allocating scarce resources in an arbitrary or discriminatory fash-
ion. 64 It can harm by skewing incentives so that its employees find it
more opportune to fail to protect or assist.65 It can harm by displacing
private services and failing to ensure adequate replacement services. 66
In short, it can harm by its ostensible omissions, as seriously as, and
often more efficiently than, by its direct, tangible actions.67
I referred earlier to the importance of determining the scope of an
act: the question of how far back in the chain of events a court is
willing to look.6 8 The fact of pervasive and longstanding government
influence makes this issue particularly complicated when the govern-
ment is the actor. If everything hinges on whether government acted
to deprive an individual of rights, or simplyfailed to act by ignoring an
existing deprivation, it becomes crucial to determine whether the dep-
rivation occurred before government acted. The action/inaction dis-
tinction does not work in part because it fails to provide a baseline, or
vantage point, for comparison. If the question is whether government
conduct has placed an individual in a worse position than she would
have been in otherwise, that conduct must be measured against some
standard.69 The conventional assumption is that the baseline should
61. The Court has held government inaction actionable in some circumstances, but has ex-
pressed hesitation in others. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985) (liability for failure to
promulgate rules); City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989) (failure to supervise
actionable only where motivated by deliberate indifference).
62. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAs L. REV.
703, 713-14 (1974).
63. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
64. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1295.
65. As Professor Peter Schuck argues, in a bureaucracy incentives are automatically skewed
in favor of inaction, since maintenance of the status quo is least likely to bring about visibility or
personal risk. This natural skewing is greatly exacerbated by legal rules which not only do not
penalize, but put a premium on, inaction. See PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 59-81
(1983); see also Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683, 688
(1983).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
67. Miller, supra note 20, at 209; Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1324-26.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
69. Professor Kreimer suggests three baselines, which he calls history, equality and predic-
tion. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1359-74 and Seth F. Kreimer, Government "Largesse" and
Constitutional Rights: Some Paths Through and Around the Swamp, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 229
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be complete lack of government involvement. Although this choice of
baseline is presented as "neutral and natural," 70 it is a choice which is
difficult to defend. Indeed, the portrayal of government as passive and
uninvolved is sharply at odds with the reality of government as perva-
sive regulator and architect of a vast web of social, economic, and
political strategies and choices.
Ultimately, mechanical use of the action/inaction distinction
masks a failure to address the essential question of government's
proper role under the Constitution. The distinction is merely a short-
hand: it cannot assist in making the value choices necessary to deter-
mine the scope of constitutional protections. Consider the proposition
that government inaction is not actionable because it is not an abuse of
power. This conclusory proposition begs the question of why inaction
is not an abuse of power. If government can do harm to constitutional
values through its inaction, insulating that inaction from judicial scru-
tiny has no apparent justification. The question of whether the harm
should be actionable simply cannot be answered without giving con-
tent to the concept of abuse of power and determining whether that
content is contiguous only with government's actions, or with its inac-
tions as well.
B. The Public/Private Distinction
The conventional wisdom holds that since the fourteenth amend-
ment limits only government and not private action, the state action
requirement should not be circumvented by permitting liability for of-
ficial failure to prevent private activity.71 This limitation is phrased in
the language of state action, but it is the familiar governmental action/
inaction distinction in slightly different linguistic clothing. The realm
of state action is the realm in which the state has acted affirmatively;
the private realm is that in which the state has failed to act to protect
its citizens from harm by other forces.
This is a highly conceptualistic application of the state action doc-
trine. It seeks to identify the sphere of government responsibility
through a simple bright line: government is accountable only when it
(1989). Although these baselines have been criticized, the insight that some baseline is needed
has been widely accepted. See Louis Michael Seidman, Reflections on Context and the Constitu-
tion, 73 MINN. L. REv. 73, 78-80 (1988); Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1450 n.150 and Larry
Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 175 (1989).
70. Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 887 (1987).
71. Currie, supra note 28, at 866.
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acts visibly and directly. 72 It faithfully reflects the belief that the influ-
ences of the public and private spheres are neatly severable, and that
the public sphere intrudes only by its tangible actions.
The state action doctrine buttresses the action/inaction distinction,
as Dean Paul Brest perceived: "In our everyday life we notice change
and movement, while things that do not change fade into the back-
ground. It is consistent that we perceive the state as involved in our
affairs when it assists in changing the status quo, and not when it as-
sists in maintaining it. ''73
Political philosophers have often emphasized the importance of a
critical vantage point from which to distinguish public and private,
noting the relativism and dependence on historical and social circum-
stances of the public/private distinction. 74 As a practical matter,
under current conditions of pervasive government regulation, the state
may be involved in every sphere in some way, whether actively or
through tacit approval. It may nevertheless be important to distin-
guish the public from the private realmsfor certain purposes, for exam-
ple to ensure that a sphere of individual privacy is protected. 75 But the
decision to create these spheres has more to do with the substantive
reach of constitutional protections than with "whether the govern-
ment has done anything to which the Constitution speaks."' 76 Ulti-
mately, the question of the proper reach of governmental power must
be faced on its own terms, and cannot be avoided through the fiction
that the public/private distinction is a natural rather than a pragmatic
construct.
I will discuss the reach of the public/private distinction, its prem-
ises, and its practical consequences in the context of the Court's recent
72. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1329 (1982).
73. Id. at 1322; see also Minow, supra note 37, at 22-25 ("neutral" action becomes non-
neutral when government fails to recognize pertinent differences).
74. See, eg., ANDREW LEVINE, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS THEORY 108
(1981); John Dewey & James H. Tufts, ETHICS, Moral and Social Problems, ch. XVI, at 495,
reprinted as abr. in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 495 (J. Somerville & R. Santoni eds.
1963).
75. The state action doctrine and the public/private distinction it has engendered have been
criticized on many levels. Scholars have questioned the coherence of the rules applying the state
action doctrine, see, e.g., Charles Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Robert
Jerome Glennon & John Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State
Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REV. 221; the wisdom of the doctrine itself, see, e.g., Brest,
supra note 72; Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); and
the philosophical basis for distinguishing public from private action, see generally Symposium on
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). The focus here is on the ways in
which the distinction flows from, or reinforces, a theory of negative rights.
76. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 18-7, at 1720; see also Brest, supra note 72, at 1330.
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decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices. 77 The DeShaney case is worthy of close scrutiny because it is a
classic example of the conventional, conceptualist approach and be-
cause it places the questions about the legitimacy of that approach in
sharp relief. It looks to bright lines like state action, causation and
custody to answer wrenching questions about government responsibil-
ity. The viability of that approach is considered in the following three
sections.
1. The Question of Responsibility
Joshua DeShaney, the child of divorced parents, was placed in his
father's custody by a Wyoming court in 1980, when he was one year
old. His father, Randy DeShaney, then took him to live in Winnebago
County, Wisconsin. When Joshua was three years old, county officials
began receiving reports that his father was physically abusing him, and
the Department of Social Services (DSS) began investigating these re-
ports. When Joshua was four, he was hospitalized with suspicious in-
juries, prompting the juvenile court to place him in temporary
custody. The county soon remanded Joshua to his father's custody,
with certain conditions. For the next fourteen months, the DSS
caseworker assigned to Joshua's case received reports and made per-
sonal observations indicating that the abuse continued, and that the
county's conditions had not been met, but took no action. In March
1984, Joshua's father beat him so brutally that he suffered irreversible
brain damage and will be institutionalized for the rest of his life.78
When told of this last beating, the caseworker said: "I just knew the
phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead."' 79 Joshua's
mother sued on his behalf for damages to assist her in paying for his
institutionalization.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the
claim that the county deprived Joshua of liberty without due process
of law. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the state was not implicated
in the deprivation of Joshua's due process rights because "[the clause]
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property
without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be ex-
tended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means."80 For Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the facts in DeShaney fall into a simple pattern: there
77. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
78. 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
79. 109 S. Ct. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 812 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1987)).
80. 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
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are the things which Randy DeShaney did to his son, Joshua, and
there are the things the state did not do to help Joshua. The state
simply failed to protect Joshua from private violence. Since the state
is not required to provide services, it need not provide them compe-
tently. Since it did not itself act violently, it is absolved of
responsibility.81
This version of events ignores the complex interaction between the
state and private entities. The state interviewed Randy DeShaney
upon receiving the first complaint of abuse. It placed Joshua in tem-
porary custody after he was hospitalized. It convened a child protec-
tion team to consider Joshua's situation. It released Joshua to his
father's custody, and placed conditions on that custody. It made regu-
lar visits to the home, and kept records of incidents observed on these
visits and of the father's failure to meet the conditions. In short, the
state made a series of conscious choices, and performed a series of
affirmative acts. Throughout, the state also made a series of conscious
decisions to take no action on its own findings and on reports from
others.8 2
One way to explain the Court's assertion that the state did not act
is to classify this series of its affirmative acts as beside the point. The
sole act that mattered was the ultimate beating of Joshua. Since the
state did not participate directly in this beating, it bears no responsibil-
ity for its occurrence.8 3
To dispute this parsimonious view of governmental responsibility,
one need not argue that the state should be responsible for its failures
to act, or for the acts of others from which it fails to protect. One need
only hold the state responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its
actions.8 4
Nevertheless, even the majority's version of the events leading up
81. 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
82. 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02; 109 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Minow,
supra note 1, at 8.
83. If the state had placed Joshua in a foster home and then taken the same series of steps,
the result might have been different. The Court specificaly declined to address the issue. 109 S.
Ct. at 1006 n.9. Since the decision, lower courts have reached varying results on the issue, See,
e.g., Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (child in foster care is in state
custody and has due process right to be free from unreasonable intrusions); B.H. v. Johnson, 715
F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same). But see Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989) (for
qualified immunity purposes, it was not clearly established in 1984 that public officials who place
foster child at risk of violence have violated due process); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County
Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989) (when foster child had been voluntarily
placed by parents, state's failure to protect him from abuse did not violate due process). For pre-
DeShaney cases holding that foster care constitutes custody for due process purposes, see cases
cited in DeShaney 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
84. The Court sidesteps this mainstream notion of responsibility by its use of a novel causa-
tion theory which I will discuss shortly. See infra text accompanying notes 95-115.
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to the final injuries illustrates the artificiality of the distinction between
state and private action. The state acted by returning Joshua to his
violent home, which it judged to be safe only if certain conditions were
met, and by undertaking to ensure that those conditions were indeed
met.8 5 There was a symbiotic relationship between the hospital, which
often was the first to learn of Joshua's injuries, and the state. The state
placed Joshua in temporary custody at the hospital, gathered informa-
tion from its staff, and assumed the statutory responsibility to act on
what it learned. 86 These facts belie the notion of a discrete series of
private acts observed by a passive state. They instead describe an in-
tricate series of interlocking acts and omissions by the state, private
agencies, and citizens.87
Moreover, the Court's version of events cannot be accepted at face
value. As Justice Brennan argued, assumptions about the starting
point, or baseline, may preordain the conclusion about whether the
state acted to cause harm.88 In one sense, the Court was willing to
trace the chain of events only to the time when the state began its
efforts to protect Joshua. These failed efforts were the only state "ac-
tions" the Court was willing to evaluate.89 Yet for comparison pur-
poses, the Court was willing to start at a time before social services
existed: it posited a situation in which the state, when faced with re-
ports of abuse, would provide no services at all, and concluded that
Joshua was no worse off than he would have been at that time.90
The only starting point the Court did not assume was the descrip-
tively accurate one. The DeShaney court failed to place the state ac-
tions at issue in the greater context of pervasive social regulation.
DSS, like other social welfare agencies, has consolidated and, in many
respects, supplanted, the preexisting web of educational, law enforce-
ment and health institutions, relatives, friends and neighbors which
used to attempt to assist abused children.9t Whether agencies like
85. 109 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apparently, the subsequent failure to
carry out this undertaking converted this series of acts into a mere failure to protect. 109 S. Ct.
at 1006.
86. 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
87. Compare the liability of the auto driver who drives too quickly and then fails to brake.
See infra text accompanying note 337.
88. 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
89. 109 S. Ct. at 1004. Professor Ernest Weinrib called this device "pseudo-nonfeasance":
distortion of misfeasance to nonfeasance by starting in the middle, or focusing on only one phase
of an action. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 253-55.
90. 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
91. See Brief for Petitioners at 27, DeShaney v. Winnebago Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct.
998 (1989) (No. 87-154); see also Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of
the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEo. L.J. 1745, 1746-57 (1987); Daley, Treating Kin Like Foster
Parents Is Straining a Child Agency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at A20, col. 5.
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DSS have improved the situation is uncertain and perhaps irrelevant;
the issue is that we cannot know what would have happened to Joshua
before the state took over the business of child protection, and we can-
not pretend it did not do so. In the context of the pervasive regulation
of child abuse which does exist, DSS clearly made a series of "calami-
tous" 9 2 decisions which subjected someone dependent on its assistance
to "private violence" 93 which he otherwise would have been spared.
At this point, the line between private and public violence, private and
public responsibility, blurs.94
2. Causation: The Requirement for Making Things Worse
When assessing government responsibility, the issue of causation is
closely intertwined with the state action inquiry. The question is
whether the government acted in a way that caused harm or whether
that harm was caused by private parties. 95 The DeShaney court ab-
solved the state of Wisconsin of responsibility because, although it
"stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a
more active role," it did not make things worse.96 Judge Posner, the
author of the lower court opinion, put the matter less delicately in
Archie v. City of Racine: "[T]he victim [in Deshaney] ... would proba-
bly have been no better off if the negligent caseworker had never inter-
vened; he would simply have been beaten into a vegetative state by his
father that much earlier."'97
Judge Easterbrook seemed to take the proposition a step further,
arguing that even when a state puts a person in danger its responsibil-
ity is to protect him "to the extent of ameliorating the incremental
risk."98
The requirement for making things worse is rooted in early com-
92. 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
93. 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
94. As Martha Minow argues, the persistent failure of responsible social agencies and society
in general to respond to such private violence implicates public patterns of conduct and morals.
Minow, supra note 1, at 8.
95. For further discussion of causation, see infra text accompanying notes 330-41; see also
Sheldon Nahmod, ConstitutionalAccountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. REV. 1,
24-29 (1982). The case of Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), illustrates the intersection
between these inquiries. In that case, the parents of a murdered girl sued the parole board of a
mental hospital for releasing her murderer, a mentally ill man of known dangerous propensities.
The Court held that the decision to release the parolee was state action, but that his action in
killing the girl five months later was not, because it was too remote a consequence of the parole
officers' actions. 444 U.S. at 284-85.
96. 109 S. Ct. at 1006-07.
97. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1225 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
98. 847 F.2d at 1223.
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mon law notions. Prosser notes that the rationale behind the common
law refusal to recognize liability for nonfeasance is that "by 'misfea-
sance' the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff,
while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least made his situation no worse." 99
Once the defendant undertook to rescue someone, his only duty at
common law was to avoid acts which would make matters worse.lc °
Applying the requirement in the constitutional realm is problem-
atic for a number of reasons. First, it relies on an oversimplified and
static version of the common law. Even the early common law found
liability for failure to rescue under certain circumstances. 10 1 In addi-
tion, the inexorable though slow trend in tort law has been to find
ways of imposing liability for failure to rescue;' 0 2 the no-duty rule may
be "in the process of being consumed and supplanted by the widening
ambit of the exceptions."' 0 3
In addition, as the courts repeatedly note, tort principles are not
always congruent with the scope of constitutional protection.
Although the courts usually use this incongruence to grant lesser pro-
tections in constitutional cases,' ° 4 it may justify the granting of
greater, or different protections, particularly when the defendant is not
an individual but a governmental entity.'0 5 The imbalance of power
between individual and government, and the nature of government it-
self, may justify a different assessment of its responsibilities. 10 6
Two major problems arise from the requirement for making things
99. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 56, at 373.
100. Id.
101. For example, in those failure to rescue cases in which the defendant had nonnegligently
placed the plaintiff in peril and then failed to rescue, the early common law held the defendant
strictly liable for the ensuing harm. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 53-54; James Barr Ames, Law
and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1908).
102. See, eg., F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 720-24 (discussing
enterprise liability, the duty on one who controls a dangerous instrumentality, the duty on volun-
teers to complete a rescue, and the growth of special relationships); see also Weinrib, supra note
41, at 248 (discussing limitation of contributory negligence to cases where plaintiff was reckless,
fading of voluntary assumption of risk rule, use of reasonable foreseeability doctrine, and in-
crease in number of special relationships).
103. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 248.
104. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465
U.S. 1049 (1984).
105. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), revd., 436 U.S.
658 (1978); Christina Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 225 (1986); Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels & Davidson, Distinguishing a Custom
or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REv. 101, 120-27 (1986); Thomas A.
Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L. REv. 443, 444 (1982). Tort law itself has
an ambivalent attitude toward governmental defendants. See infra text accompanying notes 294-
99 (discussing public duty doctrine).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 259-76.
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worse. First, measurement is difficult. The question of whether the
government has exacerbated the situation cannot be answered without
both a baseline, or vantage point, for comparison, and a method of
quantifying. The notion of "incremental harm" has no built-in time
limits. For example, it might be logically extended to hold that the
state need take no action to assist an abused foster child because he
was also abused by his biological parents. If the question is whether
Joshua DeShaney was made worse off by the government's conduct,
the notion of "worse" is meaningless without determining "worse than
things were at what point?" Worse than things would have been if
DSS did not exist? If DSS always acted in a professional manner? If it
had never released him to his father's custody? If the state of Wyo-
ming had never awarded his father custody? If he had been removed
from custody before his father hit him the second time, or the last
time? We also need some way of quantifying. Would Joshua
DeShaney have been better off had DSS not existed? Would a relative
have taken him in had she not been discouraged or prevented from
doing so because of the pervasive social welfare structure which seeks
to displace such self-help remedies?
The Court routinely assumes, as it did in DeShaney, that the stan-
dard of comparison for government actions is whether they render the
plaintiff worse off than she would have been at a time when govern-
ment provided no services. 10 7 This assumption is based on a misap-
prehension of the nature of government, and certainly of modern
government. In the aftermath of the New Deal, pervasive government
regulation and services, rather than lack of government action, has
been the norm. In light of pervasive government regulation and serv-
ices, the baseline of governmental inaction has not described the status
quo in at least half a century. 0 8
Once inaction is rejected as the status quo, the Court's assumptions
about state action become questionable. Recognition of pervasive gov-
ernment control would lead to an understanding that state action may
consist, not only of direct state action, but of inaction as well. This is
so because government is perpetual, and continually makes choices
which affect its citizens. These choices create the conditions against
which government's current actions and inactions are measured.
When government chooses to maintain the status quo, it perpetuates a
107. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
108. This assumes that the baseline is used by the Court as a reflection of the status quo. It
may instead be used normatively, as a description of what citizens are entitled to expect from
government. See infra text accompanying notes 368-69.
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condition for which it is largely responsible.10 9
Once government is viewed as ongoing, two things become clear.
First, it can cause harm by its inaction, because its bureaucracy re-
mains in motion and its actions and omissions continue to affect peo-
ple. Second, it need not make matters worse than they were before
government existed, since this is an improper baseline.
The tort law analogy on which courts often rely is that government
will be charged with an affirmative duty to act only when it has first
placed an individual in a condition of helplessness or otherwise invited
reliance on its protection. 110 Even if this limitation is accepted, a real-
istic view of the ways in which government acts and causes harm dem-
onstrates that in the realm of social services, as in numerous other
realms, government has invited reliance on its protection through reg-
ulation and provision of services, and has induced dependence on the
continuation of those services through displacement of private
alternatives. 111
The second problem with the requirement for making things worse
is that it insulates government from responsibility for its complicity, or
its contribution to constitutional injury. In state action language, the
question should not be simply whether the harm would have occurred
without private action, but whether the government's acquiescence in
that action infringed constitutional rights.1 12 As the Court has some-
times recognized, 113 state and private forces may act symbiotically. 1 4
In such cases, a test focused on sole or immediate cause is misleading.
By focusing on immediate, physical causes, the Court deflects atten-
tion from its complicity in the plight of the powerless. In causation
language, the question should be whether the government's conduct,
whether immediate or ongoing, was a substantial factor in causing the
harm. If so, the government ought not to escape liability simply be-
cause other factors also contributed. 1 5
109. See Brest, supra note 72, at 1322; Sunstein, supra note 70, at 889. In Sunstein's exam-
ple, the traditional treatment of poverty as "simply 'there'" is at odds with what is known about
government's power to control wealth distribution.
110. See Currie, supra note 28, at 873 & n.54.
111. When the government's duty is framed in this way, it becomes clear that a government
agency can be held responsible for its failure to act competently irrespective of whether it has a
duty to exist in the first place. Whether, for example, DSS must exist to protect the children of
Wisconsin is a much more difficult question, see infra note 326, and one whose consideration is
completely unnecessary to the resolution of the DeShaney case.
112. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); L. TRIE, supra
note 51, § 18-2, at 1692.
113. 365 U.S. at 724-25.
114. It can be argued that virtually any private action in which the state acquiesces impli-
cates the state. Brest, supra note 72, at 1301; Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 522.
115. Eaton, supra note 105, at 452-61. But see Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
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Ultimately, the questions can be reduced to one: Did the govern-
ment breach a constitutional duty to the injured party? This question
can be answered only by reference to a normative conception of the
scope of the due process clause. The search for bright lines based on
rules of state action and causation is a poor substitute for asking the
unavoidable question: Should this harm be chargeable to the state
under our conception of its proper role in preventing governmental
harms?
3. The Custody Limitation: The Requirement
for Forced Physical Restraint
The final issue of government responsibility raised by DeShaney is
the question of the form the state action must take. Can the state
cause harm only by a tangible, direct and physical interference with
liberty, such as a beating by a state officer or while the victim is in
physical custody, or might less tangible forms of harm, coercion and
restraint be actionable?
In this regard, the DeShaney court considered an argument by the
plaintiff which sought to create an exception to the general rule that
the state has no duty to protect against private dangers. The argument
was that a special relationship arose between Joshua and the state be-
cause it knew he faced a special danger of abuse and promised to pro-
tect him against that danger, and that this relationship gave rise to a
duty to protect. The Court held that this argument is available only to
persons in custody."16
The first cases finding a constitutional duty to protect were custody
cases. In Estelle . Gamble, 117 the Court held that prison officials must
provide adequate medical care to those in custody.1 8 It reasoned that
inmates must rely on prison authorities to provide medical care or not
receive it at all; the failure to receive care could result in suffering
violative of the eighth amendment.' 19 In Youngberg v. Romeo, 120 the
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). As Professor Eaton discusses in detail, the Mount Healthy stan-
dard, which the Court has used in mixed motive employment cases, rejects this notion in favor of
a restrictive but-for test which imposes liability for discriminatory employment decisions only if
the decisions would not otherwise have been reached. Eaton argues that this approach should
not be extended beyond the mixed motive employment context, and that it is inconsistent with
both common law tort causation principles and the goals of § 1983.
116. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-05 (1989).
117. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
118. However, the failure to do so would be actionable only ifit rose to the level of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. 429 U.S. at 106.
119. 429 U.S. at 104. The eighth amendment states: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
120. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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Court found a state duty to the involuntarily committed mentally re-
tarded arising from the due process clause. It held that when a person
is institutionalized and wholly dependent on the state a duty arises to
provide certain minimal services. 121 In Smith v. Wade, 122 the Court
found due process had been violated when a prison guard recklessly
placed two prisoners who had harassed, beaten and sexually assaulted
the plaintiff in a cell with him. 123
The DeShaney court traced the origin of the affirmative duty to
protect to the state's exercise of its power to restrain one's liberty
through "incarceration, institutionalization, or [some] similar re-
straint." 1 24 Therefore, since the state did not take Joshua into custody
or otherwise play a part in the creation of the dangers he faced, it had
no duty to protect him. 125
For a number of reasons, the custody limitation is a problematic
bright line. As Justice Brennan responded in his DeShaney dissent,
Estelle and Youngberg do not rely on the state's act of incarceration or
commitment, but on the failure to provide services once that incarcer-
ation has occurred. It was not the initial, unchallenged, deprivation of
liberty which gave rise to a duty, but the nature of the confinement:
the fact that it deprived the individual of other sources of aid.126
By its emphasis on "involuntary commitment," 127 on restraints
which "render [one] unable to care for himself,"'' 28 and on taking an
individual into custody "against his will,' 1 29 the Court casts doubt on
the state's duty to care for those who are so seriously impaired they
have no choice but to be institutionalized,130 or for children who have
121. 457 U.S. at 324.
122. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
123. But see Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), in which the Court held that no due
process claim was available to a prisoner who had been injured after he had warned prison
officials that he had been threatened by another prisoner, when the officials' failure to follow the
appropriate procedures to protect him was merely negligent. Like its companion case, Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), Davidson presages DeShaney's approach. The Davidson opinion
focused on the prison officials' failures to act, and classified them as negligent, and thus not rising
to the level of a deprivation of due process. 474 U.S. at 347-48. As in DeShaney, the Court failed
to see the omissions as conscious choices of a course of action. See Bandes, supra note 105, at
110, 129.
124. 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
125. 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
126. 109 S. Ct. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
128. 109 S. Ct. at 1005 (emphasis added).
129. 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
130. As Justice Brennan notes in DeShaney, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982),
Romeo had an "I.Q. of between 8 and 10, and the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child."
109 S. Ct. at 1009. Thus it was not the state that rendered him incapable of taking care of
himself. Id.
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been voluntarily turned over to foster care.131 Yet these individuals
are equally cut off by the state from other sources of aid, and depen-
dent on the state for protection. It is this condition of dependence
which requires state assistance to safeguard due process rights.
When the rationale for the imposition of duty is seen as the depri-
vation of other sources of aid,132 the custody limitation becomes un-
workable. When police left children alone on a busy highway by
arresting their guardian, they deprived the children of aid, although
they did not put them in custody or even place them on the high-
way.133 Likewise, when the state undertook to help Joshua, within a
regulatory structure which encouraged reliance on its promise to help
him, it "effectively confined [him] within the walls of Randy
DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took action to re-
move him." 134
Even based on the Court's rationale that the state must have
played a part in the creation of the danger, the custody limitation is
unsatisfactory. When a parole board releases a prisoner it knows to be
dangerous, it has performed an affirmative act which creates danger.
Although admittedly the parole board did not create the dangerous
prisoner, neither did it do so in Smith v. Wade. 135 It did create a
changed situation, as the people who failed to protect themselves be-
lieving their tormentors were safely in jail would attest 1 36
131. See, eg., Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476
(4th Cir. 1989), a post-DeShaney case which held that no state-imposed restraint of liberty oc-
curred when a plaintiff was voluntarily placed by his parents in foster care. It further held that
since the foster parents' contract with the Department of Social Services did not contain a de-
scription of the expected foster parent-foster child relationship, the child's physical abuse could
not be attributed to the state's failure to supervise. Id. at 476-79. This holding is not so surpris-
ing in light of the language the DeShaney court used in declining to decide whether foster care
may constitute custody: "Had the State by the affirmative exercise ofitspower removed Joshua
from free society and placed him in a foster home [he might be considered to be in custody]."
109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9 (emphasis added). But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979)
(acknowledging that children have liberty interests in not being institutionalized even when par-
ents seek institutionalization).
132. See Note, supra note 35, at 950-55.
133. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. In the lower court opinion in
DeShaney, Judge Posner sought to distinguish Rochford by characterizing it as a case in which
the police placed the victim in a situation of high risk. 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987).
Whether they indeed placed the children in the situation, or merely left them in it, as the Roch-
ford dissent argues, 592 F.2d at 392, (Kilkenny, J., dissenting), is exactly the sort of "tenuous
metaphysical" debate which the action/inaction distinction necessitates, and which the Rochford
majority declined to enter. 592 F.2d at 384.
134. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. 461 U.S. 30 (1983). See text accompanying notes 122-23.
136. Federal courts have uniformly refused to find a duty under federal law to protect the
general public from released prisoners or mental patients. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1982). Cases like Martinez have indicated that the result might be different where the state knew
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The custody limitation is the product of the Court's preoccupation
with state actions which are not only affirmative in the traditional
sense, but physically tangible. 137 Although the custody limitation is
too narrow even in light of these criteria, the criteria themselves bear
no relationship to the concerns of due process. The state decided to
leave Joshua in a violent home, subjecting him to known danger.
Whether the state acted or failed to act, whether it placed him at risk
or left him at risk, whether Joshua's confinement was physical or
based on practical, social, economic and emotional forces, 138 the result
is the same. The state abused its power by subjecting Joshua to a
known risk without giving him the help it had ensured only it could
offer.
C. The Penalty/Subsidy Distinction
Another, closely related assumption which flows from the action/
inaction distinction is that although government may not penalize
constitutionally protected activity, it is under no obligation to subsi-
dize it. To illustrate the facile cruelty of this questionable distinction,
I turn to the abortion funding decisions which engendered it.
In the first abortion funding cases, Beal v. Doe, 139 and Maher v.
of a specific threat to a known person. See 444 U.S. at 285; DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.4; see
also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976) (duty of psychiatrist to warn person of specific threat grounded in tort). But see Estate of
Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (lst Cir. 1986) (no federal liability where state knew of specific
threat to victim yet released dangerous mental patient), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
137. 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also C. MACPHERSON, Berlin's Division
of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 117 (1973). As Professor Tribe
points out, the custody cases fail to provide a helpful framework for resolving the DeShaney case
because they do not recognize the harms a state can inflict, not merely on individuals, but sys-
temically, as a result of its structure. Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space:
What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1989).
138. In the context of upholding the practice ofjuvenile preventive detention, Justice Rehn-
quist evinced an understanding that custody need not be physical:
[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Children, by definition, are
not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as
parens patriae.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citations omitted). See also The Supreme Court-
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 174 (1989) (Court's recognition of state's broad parens pa-
triae interest at odds with DeShaney Court's view of private sphere of child rearing insulated
from state intervention).
Borrowing from fourth amendment law, the issue might be framed as whether Joshua was
free to leave. The Court has long recognized that one need not be physically restrained to be
seized or arrested: the question is whether under the circumstances a reasonable person would
believe he was free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). It is difficult to
imagine where Joshua could have gone without state assistance. See also Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (liberty is more than just exemption from physical restraint).
139. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). Beal held that the Social Security Act does not require states that
participate in Medicaid to provide funding for nontherapeutic abortions.
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Roe, 140 the Court upheld governmental decisions to exempt funding
for nontherapeutic abortions from comprehensive Medicaid coverage
which included funding for childbirth. In Harris v. McRae, 141 the
Court reached a similar result regarding Medicaid funding of certain
medically necessary abortions. Most recently, in Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 142 the Court upheld restrictions on the use of pub-
lic facilities and employees to perform medically necessary abortions.
The abortion funding decisions, like the DeShaney decision, rest in
large part on the Court's rejection of the concept of affirmative govern-
mental duties. Just as the Court in DeShaney avoided imposing a duty
to protect, in the abortion funding cases it avoided imposing a duty to
assist women in obtaining medical care.
The Webster decision, for example, rejected a challenge to a Mis-
souri statute which placed several regulations and limitations on the
performance of abortions in the state. 143 Of relevance here is the
Court's resolution of the challenge to a prohibition on the use of public
facilities or employees to perform abortions. The challenged statutes
made it unlawful "for any public employee within the scope of his
employment to perform or assist an abortion, not necessary to save the
life of the mother"; 144 and "for any public facility to be used for the
purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not necessary to save
the life of the mother." 145
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his discussion for the Court with a
citation from the DeShaney opinion: "[O]ur cases have recognized
that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual."' 46 The Court reasoned that although the
140. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Maher held that the equal protection clause does not require a
state participating in the Medicaid program to fund nontherapeutic abortions although it pays
for childbirth. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (equal protection clause does not
require municipal hospitals to provide facilities for elective abortions although they do so for
childbirth).
141. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
142. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
143. Four sections of the Missouri Act were at issue: the preamble, which found that life
begins at conception and that unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-
being (Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1),(2) (1986)); the prohibition on the use of public facilities or
employees to perform abortions (Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 188.210, .215 (1986)); the prohibition on
public funding of abortion counselling (Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.205 (1986)); and the requirement
that physicians conduct viability tests prior to performing abortions (Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.029
(1986)). 109 S. Ct. at 3049.
144. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.210 (1986).
145. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.215 (1986).
146. 109 S. Ct. at 3051 (quoting DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003).
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State may not itself prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion, it
need not assist her in obtaining one.
The Court saw its decision upholding the restriction as a logical
outgrowth of Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae. In those cases, the
Court held that a state may "make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion and... implement that judgment by the allocation
of public funds." 147 The Webster court found it a logical next step to
permit implementing the value judgment through allocation of other
public resources, such as hospitals and medical staff.148 Although the
Court of Appeals had found that preventing access to a public facility
went beyond demonstrating a political choice in favor of childbirth,
and actually narrowed or foreclosed the availability of abortion to wo-
men, 149 Justice Rehnquist rejected this reasoning:
[T]he State's decision here to use public facilities and staff to encourage
childbirth over abortion places no governmental obstacle in the path of a
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy .... Missouri's refusal
to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves
a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not
to operate any public hospitals at all.15°
Webster, like Maher and Harris before it, purports to apply the
same simple principle that engendered the DeShaney result. The
Court casts the claim as one for basic government services; here, medi-
cal services. The Court assumes that there is no constitutional right to
medical services, and that the government can withhold all such serv-
ices if it so chooses. This assumption provides the basis for compari-
son: the harm to indigent women is measured against a baseline of no
services at all. The greater power to withdraw all medical services
implies the lesser power to withdraw only some such services. 151
In short, the decision to withhold funding or use of public facilities
is cast as a failure to give affirmative aid: the mere withholding of a
benefit or subsidy. It is not an act of government interference or coer-
cion, but simply a legitimate choice by government not to help. The
government has not interfered with the right of indigent women to
obtain abortions; it has merely chosen not to subsidize the
procedure. 152
147. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, quoted in Harris, 448 U.S. at 314.
148. 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
149. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1081 (8th Cir. 1988), revd., 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
150. 109 S. Ct. at 3052 (citation omitted).
151. As noted supra note 18, this power is limited by the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. As will be discussed infra at text accompanying notes 159-67, this doctrine poses consider-
able obstacles in the Webster context.
152. See, eg., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
2299August 1990]
Michigan Law Review
In both semantic and legal terms, the Court's meaning in describ-
ing these restrictions as mere decisions not to subsidize is elusive.
One possible meaning is that the result of the restrictions is not to
penalize at all. A second possible meaning is that the intent of the
restrictions is not to penalize the exercise of the right to abortion; any
penalty is only an innocent byproduct of the decision to fund child-
birth in preference to abortion. The third is that even if the states do
intend to penalize the right, they may accomplish this end through a
passive failure to subsidize, but not through an active use of penalty.
In a very limited sense, the first meaning is correct: the Court did
not see the loss of access to abortions for poor women as being a result
of the funding restrictions. It recognized that many indigent women
choosing abortions would no longer be able to obtain them once the
restrictions were in force,153 but attributed this not to the government
restrictions themselves, but to the women's preexisting condition of
indigency.154 That is, it was not the government's action which caused
this deprivation. This formulation rests on particular assumptions
about state action, causation and the appropriate baseline for measur-
ing deprivation which will be considered shortly.
As to the second meaning, if the Court meant to absolve the gov-
ernment of an intent to discourage abortion, it set itself an impossible
task. The legislative history straightforwardly established that the leg-
islation was motivated by the purpose of discouraging abortion. 55
Seemingly, the Court's own finding that the restrictions were meant to
implement "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion" 56 es-
tablishes just such a purpose.
153. The restrictions upheld in Harris have had this effect. See Trussell, Menken, Lindheim
& Vaughan, The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financing for Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
120 (1980). The Webster Court's not very reassuring remark that "[tihe challenged provisions
only restrict a woman's ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a
physician affiliated with a public hospital" (109 S. Ct. at 3052) recalls Captain Black's explana-
tion to Milo Minderbender: "[Tihis whole program is voluntary, Milo - don't forget that, The
men don't have to sign [the] loyalty oath if they don't want to. But we need you to starve them to
death if they don't. It's just like Catch-22. Don't you get it? You're not against Catch-22, are
you?" JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22, at 113 (1955); see also Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052; Harris,
448 U.S. at 314; Maher, 432 U.S, at 474.
154. Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474); Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
155. As to Harris, see Michael Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the
Hyde Amendment Case" A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 1113, 1125-26
(1980); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 89-90 (1988). As to
Webster, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Missouri legislature "intended its abortion
regulations to be understood against the backdrop of its theory of life," which was that life begins
at conception. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 851 F.2d 1071,
1076 (8th Cir. 1988)).
156. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
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This is where the penalty/subsidy distinction comes in: it enables
the Court to finesse the intent problem. The reasoning might be re-
duced to the following: (1) The purpose of withdrawing the subsidy
was to burden the exercise of the right to abortion. (2) The effect of
the withdrawal may be to burden the exercise of the right. (3) But the
first two propositions are irrelevant because the withdrawal was not a
direct, coercive action by the government, but merely a failure to as-
sist.. In short, the third suggested meaning is the correct one: the gov-
ernment may accomplish the otherwise illegitimate end of
purposefully burdening a protected right, so long as it achieves it by
indirect subsidy, not direct penalty. 157
The abortion funding cases, then, have made the difference be-
tween a penalty and a subsidy crucially important, and in fact out-
come determinative. 158 Although it would seem incumbent on the
Court to explain why the distinction is legally significant, the question
157. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1500-02 (decision "turned on the supposed absence of
coercive acts, not on absence of rights-pressuring purpose").
158. The penalty/subsidy distinction has also been applied outside the abortion funding con-
text. For example, in Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1, 87-89 (1976) (per curiam) the Court upheld a
provision of the Campaign Finance Act which approved reimbursement of up to two million
dollars for expenses to major political parties, a lesser amount to minor parties, and no reim-
bursement at all to parties or candidates which could not qualify as minor. The Maher Court
cited Buckley for the proposition that interference with a protected right is prohibited, but en-
couragement of an alternate activity is not. 432 U.S. at 475. Maher interpreted Buckley to hold
that the subsidy provisions did not burden the rights of the nonqualifying candidates, but merely
enhanced the opportunities of the eligible candidates. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475-76 n.9 (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94-95). For criticism of this reasoning, see Marlene Nicholson, Political
Campaign Expenditure Limitations and the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HAS'rINGS
CONST. L.Q. 601, 616-17 (1983); see also Sunstein, supra note 70, at 883-84 (Court in Buckley
assumes state must take disparities in wealth and consequent access to fora as "a part of nature
for which government bears no responsibility").
The penalty/subsidy distinction has also been invoked in the context of congressional refusal
to fund offensive art. In the wake of an outcry over a provocative photography exhibit which
had been subsidized by a grant from the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA), Congress
recently adopted a law which will enable it to withdraw such funding for exhibits the NEA
judges to be obscene. See Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 738 (1989). Its proponents defend
the law as a simple refusal to subsidize. See, eg., Hilton Kramer, Is Art Above the Laws of
Decency?, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, § 2, at 1, 7, cols. 1-5. There is some precedent for this
position. See Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir.) (upholding content
based withdrawal of arts funding on the theory that it does not constitute suppression, but rather
promotion of another's work in its stead), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976). However, particu-
larly in light of the overwhelming power government has to determine artists' access, not only to
grants, but to fora for the display of their work, see Grace Glueck, Border Skirmish: Art and
Politics, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 2, at 1, 22, cols. 1-5, and Paul Mattick Jr., Arts and the
State: The N.EA. Debate in Perspective, THE NATION, Oct. 1, 1990, at 348, the issue of whether
the government may withhold funding from first amendment activity based on content may not
be so clear cut. See, eg., Kenneth Karst, Public Enterprise and Public Forum: A Comment on
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 255-59 (1976); Marlene Nichol-
son, The Constitutionality of Contribution Limitations in Ballot Measure Elections, 9 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 683, 731-33 (1981); Kathleen Sullivan, A Free Society Doesn't Dictate to Artists, N.Y. Times,
May 18, 1990, at A-31, col. 2.
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is never addressed. Once the activity is labeled a mere subsidy, the
Court treats the matter as closed.
The Court's treatment of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
which would seem to pose an obstacle to the refusal to fund protected
activity, is illustrative. The doctrine holds that government may not
condition receipt of benefits on relinquishment of constitutional rights,
even if the receipt of the benefits is otherwise a mere privilege.1 59 The
Harris court admitted that under the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine a legislature may not withhold all Medicaid benefits from an
otherwise eligible candidate simply because she has exercised her right
to abortion. The Court reasoned, however, that a legislature may
withhold the particular benefits which enable a woman to exercise that
right, because "this represents simply a refusal to subsidize certain
protected conduct... [which] ... without more, cannot be equated
with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." 160 That is, "denial
of funding that enables a person to exercise a constitutional right is not
a penalty, but denial of other benefits because he or she chooses to
exercise such a right would be considered a penalty." 161
The distinction is baffling. The Court fails to explain why the re-
fusal to subsidize protected conduct does not violate the unconstitu-
tional conditions rule. The fact that the statute does not sweep more
broadly to exempt unprotected conduct as well hardly clarifies the
matter. The linchpin of the argument seems to be that a condition
which would otherwise be unconstitutional is acceptable if it takes the
form of a refusal to subsidize, rather than a penalty.1 62
In what way does the refusal to subsidize differ from a penalty on
protected activity? The Court's response is to invoke the "greater-in-
159. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 10-8, at 681.
Thus, the doctrine represented a rejection of the right-privilege distinction, which held that when
one receives a privilege from government, it may be withheld absolutely, and therefore may be
withheld conditionally, though the condition is otherwise unconstitutional. See Justice Holmes'
opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); see also
Sullivan, supra note 18; Epstein, supra note 155; William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Nicholson, supra note
158, at 612-14; and supra note 18 (discussing the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine).
160. 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
161. Nicholson, supra note 158, at 615.
162. The Court may be saying that the refusal to subsidize abortion is germane to legitimate
governmental objectives, but a withdrawal of all medicaid coverage for a woman who has exer-
cised her right to choice would not be germane. If so, the Court's reasoning illustrates Professor
Sullivan's point that germaneness "is a poor benchmark for distinguishing constitutional from
unconstitutional conditions." (Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions and the Distri-
bution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 327, 329-30 (1989)). If encouraging childbirth over
abortion is a legitimate end, cutting off all medicaid benefits to women who choose abortion
would be an effective way to accomplish it, and different only in degree from cutting off funding
for the abortion itself. Conversely, if the right to abortion is constitutionally protected, it is not
clear why either consequence should be acceptable.
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cludes-the-lesser" argument. Since the government has no obligation
to fund any medical procedures or provide any medical facilities, it
may decide, for any reason, 163 not to fund particular procedures. This
does not penalize because it leaves the woman in the same position she
would have been in without any government intervention, and that
position is fixed by her individual condition of poverty, rather than
any affirmative act of the government. 164
The Court's invocation of the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine
completes an argument of nearly perfect circularity. This doctrine,
initially an attempt to claim governmental freedom from any restric-
tions on its largess, was severely limited by the ascendancy of the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine. 165 As Justice Brennan pointed out
in his dissent in Harris, the demise of the right-privilege distinction
means that government may no longer premise a grant of gratuitous
benefits on the relinquishment of constitutional rights. 166 The Court
disingenuously responded that the government's withholding of fund-
ing had done nothing to force relinquishment of the right to choose
abortion; it has merely made it more attractive not to exercise it.167
Several unstated assumptions underlie the Court's reasoning.
First, there is the choice of a baseline. Justice Brennan argued that the
Hyde amendment, at issue in Harris, imposed unconstitutional condi-
tions because it deprived women of benefits to which they were other-
wise entitled. 168 Thus, Justice Brennan judged the results of the
legislation in comparison to the status quo ante, which included full
coverage for medically necessary services. 169 In contrast, the majority
used as its point of comparison a time before there was any subsidized
health care at all. It treated the baseline of government inaction as the
only logical point of comparison. When compared to a complete fail-
ure to subsidize, a government decision to fund childbirth but not
abortion can only be seen as an expansion of opportunities for indigent
women.170
The argument that government has taken no action, or at least no
163. This is the "greater includes the lesser" doctrine in its most archaic form. See supra
note 18; see also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 75, 100 (1980) ("[a] state
cannot refuse to extend benefits on a forbidden basis, even if the refusal creates no government
obstacle to the exercise of a right").
164. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989).
165. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1458-61.
166. Harris v. McRae, 484 U.S. 297, 334-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 315-16.
168. See id. at 336 n.6.
169. See id. at 332-37.
170. See Epstein, supra note 155, at 90.
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coercive action, because it has not made women worse off than they
were twenty-five years ago, 171 has some obvious flaws. 172 First, it as-
gumes that the propriety of the government's conduct and motivation
can be judged solely by reference to its results. 173 Second, it presents a
woman's "choice" in the starkest possible terms, then concludes that
forcing women to choose the lesser evil is not coercive. But the fact
that women could be threatened with the loss of all subsidized medical
care does not render voluntary their choice to lose only subsidized
abortion. 174 Finally, it is simply impossible to know whether women
would have been worse off twenty-five years ago. Pervasive subsidies
have existed for a long time, and they have changed the landscape so
irrevocably that it is no longer possible to know what health care op-
tions would have been open to poor women if subsidized care had not
displaced them. 175
Even assuming for the moment that "making things worse" should
be the standard, the restrictions at issue in Webster would likely satisfy
it. The ban on the use of public facilities defined "public" so broadly
that, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, it would apply to the many
privately owned facilities using property which is publicly owned,
leased or controlled. 176 Here the government's role as landowner and
171. The Medicaid program was adopted in 1965.
172. Once again it should be noted that this argument has ramifications for both state action
and causation: the question of whether the state, by its action, caused the harm, or whether it
was caused by private forces. See supra note 95.
173. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163-70 (1963) (need for motive anal-
ysis in due process context); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (need for motive
analysis in equal protection context).
174. See Seidman, supra note 69, at 78-79; SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 130, 130 n.1 (1970).
175. Since abortion was not legal in 1965, history provides no indication of what abortion
facilities would have been available to poor women before the advent of subsidized medical care.
176. 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A four-member plurality voted to
uphold §§ 188.200 and .215 of the Missouri statute. Justice O'Connor declined to consider a
facial challenge to the provisions on the ground that they might have some constitutional appli-
cations. 109 S. Ct. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Even prior to Webster, there was evidence that the refusal by public hospitals to perform abor-
tions may also exert pressure on the few completely private hospitals which might have provided
abortion services. See L. Belkin, Women in Rural Areas Face Many Barriers to Abortion, N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1989, at Al, col. 3; see also ACLU REPRODUCnVE FREEDOM PROJECT, SUM-
MARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 25 (1989):
The Court's approval of this provision will make other states more likely to attempt to
prohibit abortion at public facilities. Restricting access to hospital-based abortion will harm
women who require hospitalization for abortion services because of life-threatening medical
conditions; women who need late abortions because they discover late in pregnancy that the
fetus has severe anomalies; rural women and poor women who often depend on local public
hospitals as their primary medical providers; and teenagers who tend to seek abortion later
in pregnancy and who often face greater health risks than adult women. Worst of all, be-
cause many "public" hospitals are also teaching institutions, fewer and fewer practitioners
will acquire the expertise either to perform abortions or to remedy the effects of botched
abortions.
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provider of monopoly utilities 177 provides a graphic illustration of the
pervasive reach of its power, in the face of which the individual's abil-
ity to protect her own rights to access is severely compromised. The
traditional conception of the government as a passive entity forbidden
to provide services is at odds with its identity as a major economic
player in its own right.1 78
As to the correctness of the "making things worse" standard itself,
the criticisms of that standard were presented earlier.' 79 The abortion
funding cases show why the standard is insufficient in the context of
indigency.
The requirement for making things worse is intertwined with the
Court's assumptions about choice and fault. The assumptions are
twofold: a woman's indigency is of her own making, or at least not the
government's fault; and it is that indigency which prevents her from
obtaining an abortion. Beginning with the latter assumption, it is a
dangerous half truth. Certainly if a woman could afford an abortion
she would not need government assistance or government facilities.
But in the context of subsidized health care, her indigency is an im-
pediment only because the government has acted to single out this
procedure as one it will not protect from the vagaries of the free mar-
ket. 180 Given that the right is constitutionally protected, a strong ar-
gument can be made that at minimum government is required to
maintain a neutral stance toward its exercise, if not to make affirma-
tive efforts to safeguard its exercise.' 8 ' In any case, it defies common
sense to argue that the government's choice is not a substantial cause
of the woman's inability to obtain an abortion. 8 2
The concept of the vagaries of the free market raises the former
See also Frances Olsen, Comment: Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REv. 105, 105 n.5
(1989) (effect of Webster decision in Missouri has been to lead "public and private hospitals to
refuse to allow abortions... and one state university to bar talk of abortion").
177. The appellees and amici in Webster suggested that the ban was so broadly worded that
it could be enf6rced against private hospitals using public water and sewer lines. See 109 S. Ct. at
3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
178. See Regina Austin, The Problem of the Legitimacy of the Welfare State, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1510, 1511 (1982) (government is both "the regulator and the competitor of private eco-
nomic concerns").
179. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115.
180. Tribe, supra note 9, at 336.
181. Id. at 338-40; see also Perry, supra note 155, at 1122; Margaret Radin, Market-Inaliena-
bility, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1900-01 (1987). As the Griffin-Douglas line of cases has recog-
nized in the equal protection context, government may under certain conditions be required to
subsidize some services to ensure that the inability to afford them does not effect a forced waiver.
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
182. 448 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See discussion of causation and complicity
supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
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assumption: that a woman's indigency is of her own making, or not
the government's fault. Professor Macpherson's critique of Berlin's
division of liberty is relevant:
Vulgar proponents of free enterprise [may argue that poverty and depen-
dence are not the result of other people's arrangements]. But free enter-
prise theories of any standing from Adam Smith to Bentham to Mill...
have recognized that it is indeed arrangements made by other human
beings (as well as differences in native abilities and industriousness) that
determine the distribution of wealth and poverty.... [This distribution]
is a matter of social institutions, [which decide how property is to be
held or controlled].... [This] unequal access... diminishes.., negative
liberty, since dependence on others ... diminishes the area in which
[people] cannot be pushed around.183
The abortion funding cases are testimony to the fact that people
without resources, dependent on government for the ability to exercise
their constitutional rights, can be pushed around. Webster provides
perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Macpherson's point, since it
reveals the extent of government's control over property, and the ease
with which, in denying access to that property, it can diminish essen-
tial liberties.
The response, that the loss of liberty is caused by the marketplace,
not the government, is too facile. It is uncontroversial that govern-
ment activity affects wages, prices and job and housing availability,18 4
and protects certain entitlements but not others.18 5 While the extent
to which government activity affects the incidence of poverty is a sub-
ject of disagreement, 186 the Court's comfortable assumption that the
woman unable to afford a private abortion has brought her plight
upon herself with no help from her government does not bear close
scrutiny. 187
183. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 137, at 100-01; see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the
Market" A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1515 (1983) (laissez
faire theory denies or particularizes and privatizes inequality).
184. See Bendich, supra note 20, at 413-14.
185. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970); Morris Cohen, Property and Sover-
eignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
186. See, eg., Austin, supra note 178, at 1511; Richard A. Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for
Welfare Rights, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 201, 225-29; Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Di-
chotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1429, 1431
(1982); see also Passell, Forces in Society, and Reaganism, Helped Dig Deeper Hole for Poor, N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1989, at 1, cols. 4-5; 12, cols. 6-8,.
187. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) ("We have come to recognize that
forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty."); L. TRIBE, supra note 51,
§ 16-49. See also Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1499 n.366 (although government does not create
poverty, "it does create a hierarchy between women who are and are not dependent on public
medical insurance when it enacts a selective subsidy"). Fran Olsen unmasks another wrong
assumption about choice and fault in the abortion debate: that women almost always exercise a
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Ultimately, the Court's holdings in Harris and Webster, whether
cast in terms of due process or equal protection, 8" of state action,
unconstitutional conditions, or causation, depend for their support on
the proposition that a refusal to subsidize is per se permissible nonin-
terference. What is never explained in the Court's opinions is the ra-
tionale for the foundation on which the entire abortion funding edifice
is built: that there is a legally significant difference between a penalty
and a subsidy.
Government cannot imprison or fine a woman for exercise of the
right to abortion. Although government cannot fine her, perhaps it
may charge her money, although it is providing all other medical serv-
ices for free. This may be consistent with the Court's refusal to impose
affirmative funding obligations.18 9 But under what meaning of the
word would this charge be anything other than a penalty?190 It cer-
tainly imposes a tangible disadvantage on the woman by virtue of her
choice of abortion over childbirth. 191 If the government itself may not
levy a charge, the question arises whether it can exempt abortion from
a comprehensive scheme of subsidized medical care for the indigent,
when the effect will be identical: to impose a charge which the
targeted women cannot afford to pay. 192 The crucial question, again,
is under what theory this action avoids being called a penalty. 193
free, uncoerced choice about whether to have sexual intercourse. Olsen, supra note 176, at 124-
26.
188. In Harris, the equal protection claim fell based on the due process finding. Because the
court found that a mere refusal to subsidize could not burden due process rights and that there-
fore no fundamental right had been violated, it saw no reason to use strict scrutiny in addressing
the equal protection claim that the state had unfairly singled out abortions for differential treat-
ment. Under minimal scrutiny, it upheld the claim. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-23. But see 448
U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Robert Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens
and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 978, 1009-17 (1981).
189. 448 U.S. at 318.
190. See JOEL FEINBERG, The Idea of a Free Man, in RIGHTS, JUSICE AND THE BOUNDS
OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 8 (1980).
191. "Penalty: A punishment imposed for breach of law, rule, or contract; a loss, disability
or disadvantage of some kind... ; sometimes specifically the payment of a sum of money im-
posed in such a case .... " THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1971).
192. Harris, 448 U.S. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1497 n.358 (same danger is posed whether the state uses
sanctions or bribes); Epstein, supra note 155, at 90 (Harris sidesteps bar on fines by offering
financial inducements). But see Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats and Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 289, 303-308 (1989) (arguing that an offer to increase benefits (or
subsidize) is less troublesome than a threat to decrease them (or penalize), especially in context of
government benefit programs). The use of the encourage/discourage dichotomy, see Harris, 448
U.S. at 315 (basic difference between interference with a protected activity and encouragement of
an alternate activity), is equally elusive. There are many possible ways to encourage childbirth.
See Brief for a Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at
28-29, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) (States may
encourage respect for human life by assuring that women do not become pregnant as a result of
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The Court's only real answer to the question is to restate its con-
clusion. A failure to subsidize is not a penalty because it is not an act,
it is a failure to act. It does not coerce, it does not place obstacles in a
woman's way.
Yet the government can coerce and create obstacles by selectively
withholding funding or access to public health care from those with no
other viable options. 194 Although the imposition of legal control takes
a more subtle form than a fine or imprisonment, the result, like the
purpose, may be exactly the same.195 The question the Court should
have addressed in the abortion funding cases was whether the right to
abortion is important enough to protect from the inevitable burdens
imposed by the government's choices. 196
It may well be that the Court did make a value choice about the
protection to which the right to abortion is entitled, and therefore rati-
fied the government choices it reviewed in Harris and Webster. 19 7 This
is a substantially different matter from presenting the entire sequence
as a series of failures to act. Just as government deliberately acted to
discourage abortion, so did the Court make a decision to ratify these
acts, a decision which will ensure that the obstacles remain in place,
and which was not compelled by the nearly inyisible distinction be-
tween a penalty and a subsidy.
III. THE CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES: LOOSING THE
TENACIOUS GRIP OF THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The idea of the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties,
which pervades the judicial way of talking about constitutional rights,
is much more than a rhetorical flourish. It translates into a restrictive
series of assumptions about governmental action which serves to ex-
clude whole categories of government misconduct and individual suf-
fering from the ambit of constitutional protection. These assumptions
have been treated as virtually sacrosanct. To call the Constitution a
involuntary sexual relations, by making adequate contraceptive counseling available, enhancing
health education and medical care, providing assurance of adequate support for lives of children
against starvation and malnutrition, violence, abuse and disease, and by setting example through
its own treatment of women and children.). The schemes in Harris and Webster appear to en-
courage childbirth through a different method: discouraging abortion.
194. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 332-34.
195. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 8.
196. Tribe, supra note 9, at 335-36; Perry, supra note 155; Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 337, 343-45 (1989).
197. Had the Court made such a choice explicitly, it would have been forced to confront the
fact that it was impermissible under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Perry, supra note
155; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 163, at 104-05; Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1457
n.358; see also Tribe, supra note 9, at 336.
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charter of negative rights is to state a conclusion; yet the Court has
mistaken conclusory rhetoric for the reasoning which should have pre-
ceded it.
This Part seeks to understand why the conventional wisdom about
negative liberties has held constitutional jurisprudence in such power-
ful sway. It first examines the constitutional arguments against affirm-
ative duties and concludes that they are only a small part of the
explanation for their wholesale rejection. It then looks to the philo-
sophical and common law sources of the conventional wisdom in or-
der to trace the deeply entrenched assumptions underlying the
rejection of affirmative duties. Finally, it examines the tenacious argu-
ments against affirmative duties which can be loosely characterized as
"slippery slope" objections.
This Part seeks to show that although the conventional wisdom
about negative and affirmative rights presents itself as neutral and in-
exorable, rather than as a particular way of thinking, shaped by partic-
ular influences, 198 it is instead an amalgam of vestigial common law
notions, individualistic political philosophy, originalist constitutional
theory, and fear of the slippery slope. More accurately, it relies on
deeply rooted notions about common law and philosophy and makes
little attempt to understand the Constitution on its own terms. Yet
major constitutional decisions have been based on an unquestioning
belief in the rightness of this way of thinking.
It will argue that none of the traditional assumptions is entitled to
a priori status. Each represents a choice: about the extent of reliance
on the common law, and the interpretation of the common law relied
on; about the particular philosophic tradition adhered to; about the
allocation of resources, and, ultimately, about the values the Constitu-
tion should protect. When the assumptions are treated as neutral and
inexorable, the result is choices which are unarticulated and
unjustified.
A. The Constitutional Source
According to the conventional wisdom, the source of the refusal to
recognize positive constitutional rights is the Constitution: its text and
the intent of the Framers. In a recent article, Professor David Currie
set forth the classic argument for the proposition that the conventional
wisdom, at least in the due process context, is justified by the Constitu-
tion itself.199 He argued that the lack of affirmative due process rights
198. Martha Minow says: "Unstated reference points lie hidden in legal discourse, which is
full of the language of abstract universalism." Minow, supra note 37, at 44-45.
199. Currie argues that a distinction exists between positive and negative constitutional
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could be inferred ftrom the language and context of the clause: "the
due process clause is phrased as a prohibition, not an affirmative com-
mand," in contrast to other constitutional guarantees, such as the
right to counsel.200 He further argued that the ratification debates
support the idea that "the Bill of Rights was designed to protect
against 'abuse of... power[]'. . ., and in particular to limit the powers
of Congress" and not to help needy citizens. 201 In fact, he argued, the
Framers were not even sure Congress had the power to help needy
citizens.202
The conventional argument, then, is that the refusal to recognize
affirmative governmental obligations is supported by the text of the
Constitution and the Framers' intent. Both foundations are flimsy.
The conventional wisdom portrays the text and Framers' intent as ob-
jective measures of the Constitution's meaning. However, text and in-
tent lead to a rejection of affirmative governmental duties only when
certain interpretational choices are made.
The argument from the Framers' intent assumes the legitimacy of
an originalist mode of interpretation: that the Court should enforce
only those values that are clearly stated in the text of the Constitution
or intended by the Framers.20 3 The conventional wisdom relies on the
Framers' intent and the conditions which prevailed at the time the
Constitution was drafted. The Framers' intent was neither monolithic
nor crystal clear in this regard. Scholars have argued that even if the
sole intent was to keep government from invading the private realm,
the Framers sought to accomplish this goal by imposing on govern-
ment affirmative obligations to provide certain safeguards. The pur-
pose of these safeguards was to prevent government from dominating
its citizens by virtue of its tremendous power.204 On a more utopian
note, scholars have argued that the Framers imposed affirmative obli-
gations to enforce the social contract and to enable citizens to realize
rights, and that as a general rule only negative rights are protected by the due process clause. He
notes, however, that the notion that the Constitution protects negative liberties should not be
used as a "talisman capable of resolving a broad spectrum of problems against the existence of
governmental duties that can in some sense be deemed affirmative." Currie, supra note 28, at
887.
200. Id. at 865.
201. Id. at 874.
202. Currie, supra note 28, at 865-66; see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221
(7th Cir. 1988) ("Amendments designed to protect the people from the government... adopted
when governmental services were more likely to be viewed as forbidden than desirable ...
phrased as prohibitions on governmental action ... are not a plausible source of mandatory
rescue services.")
203. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
204. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 333-34; Michelman, supra note 20, at 9.
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the promises of the Declaration of Independence. 20 5
Moreover, the extent of reliance on the Framers' intent involves
choices. The originalist approach which interprets the Constitution
based solely on the plain meaning of the text and the verifiable intent
of the Framers has been criticized widely.20 6 Even if the intent of the
Framers is agreed to be the sole proper inquiry, it is necessary to de-
cide whether their specific intent will be required, or their more gen-
eral intent will suffice.207 If, for example, the Framers' general intent
was to disable government from dominating citizens by virtue of its
unequal power, that intent may be effectuated through positive obliga-
tions to protect as well as negative constraints. 208
Finally, even assuming the notion of a negative constitution accu-
rately describes the late eighteenth century, any argument to impose it
on the late twentieth century must reckon with the vast changes which
have occurred since the 1930s. The welfare state, with its proliferation
of government regulation and subsistence programs, little resembles
the polity with which the Framers were familiar.20 9 To construe cur-
rent constitutional protections based on an antiquated world view is a
choice which may be difficult to justify. 210
The argument from the text of the Constitution suffers from simi-
lar disabilities. The text of the Constitution does not support the idea
that, as a whole, it was meant to be solely a charter of negative rights.
Although many of the rights it provides are phrased negatively, 211
205. See Bendich, supra note 20, at 409; Charles Black, Further Reflections on the Constitu-
tional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1986); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Cen-
tury of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 21 (1987);
Miller, supra note 20, at 245-46.
206. See, eg., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rav. 204 (1980).
207. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1085 (1981). Professors Wasserstrom
and Seidman illustrate this point in the fourth amendment context. A rigid originalist approach
might limit the reach of that amendment to the "general warrants that angered the colonists in
the pre-Revolutionary period." A more flexible originalist might attempt to determine whether
modem intrusions like wiretaps or drug tests serve as the "modem equivalent of general war-
rants." Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitu-
tional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 57-58 (1988); see also Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 395-409.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29, 50-55.
209. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1455 n.170; Sunstein, supra note 70, at 886-88; Kreimer,
supra note 9, at 1295.
210. "Due process was not restricted to rules fixed in the past, for that 'would be to deny
every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.'"
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176-77 (1968) (HaHan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884)); see also Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 207, at 58
(preference for Framers' preferences must be justified).
211. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law); art. I,
§ 9, cl. 5 (no tax or duty on articles exported from any state); art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (no title of nobility
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many are also phrased affirmatively.2 12 Even as to the rights which
are phrased negatively, their enforcement may require the imposition
of affirmative obligations on government. 213 The conventional wisdom
treats the affirmative rights as exceptions to the general rule, but there
is nothing inexorable about this conclusion.
More specifically, the language of the due process clause does not
mandate the conclusion that it prohibits only affirmative acts, and not
omissions. Although its language prohibits certain deprivations, it af-
firmatively demands that when the government does deprive, it must
afford due process of law, something which only the government can
provide.2 14 Finally, to say that the clause protects against abuse of
power says very little about the form such abuse must take, or specifi-
cally, about whether government can abuse by its inaction as well as
its action.215
Invariably, assertions about the text of the Constitution and the
Framers' intent seem to overlook the fourteenth amendment. The
fourteenth amendment is the product of a radical shift in the percep-
tion of the duties of the federal government. 216 Its legislative history
shall be granted by United States); amend. I ("Congress shall make no law"); amend. II (the
right to bear arms shall not be infringed); amend. VIII ("excessive bail shall not be required").
212. See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("House of Representatives shall be composed of");
art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (privilege of writ of habeas corpus); art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (regular statement and
account of receipts and expenditures shall be published); art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (President will pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution); amend. IV (warrant and probable cause require-
ments); amend. V (grand jury requirement); amend. VI (right to speedy, public jury trial;
confrontation, compulsory process, counsel); amend. VII (right to civil jury trial); see supra notes
24-29 and accompanying text.
213. See, eg., supra note 51 (discussion of the first amendment). Professor Arthur Selwyn
Miller points out that any time the Court decides a norm-creating case, it is imposing affirmative
duties on the organs of government to enforce that norm. See Miller, supra note 20, at 229-35.
As I have argued, all judicial decisionmaking creates norms because it creates precedent. See
Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. Rav. 227, 299 (1990). Thus, all decisions impose
affirmative duties of enforcement. The remedial question of the form that enforcement must take
(e.g., preclusion of other courts, damages paid by offending entity, simple negative injunction or
complex structural injunction against entity) must be kept distinct from questions about the
existence of the enforcement duties themselves. See infra text accompanying notes 354-64.
214. The due process clause provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This seems little
different from: If any State deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, it must provide due
process of law. See J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 121 (1965) (due process imposes affirm-
ative obligations on government to protect against private action); ROBERT JENNINGS HARRIS,
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 42-44 (1960) (same); Tribe, supra note 9, at 331 (government may
have to make an affirmative exertion to protect rights, e.g., it cannot dispense with a hearing to
save time or money).
215. See, eg., Miller, supra note 20, at 209 (government power to do nothing is itself a signifi-
cant power); see also William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A
Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. Rav. 515, 567-70 (1989)
(failure to act can constitute abuse of power); Sunstein, supra note 70, at 888 (whether there is a
deprivation depends on antecedent conceptions of entitlement).
216. See L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 7-2, at 550.
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reflects that an overriding purpose of its passage was to require the
federal government to protect its citizens in the face of the states' fail-
ure to do so. A strong argument can be made that both the equal
protection and due process clauses were meant to impose on govern-
ment an affirmative duty to protect against private action.217
In short, neither the language nor the history of the Constitution
prohibits affirmative government duties. The arguments against af-
firmative duties are based on a series of choices: methodological
choices on one level, but ultimately substantive choices about the role
of government. In light of their indeterminacy, the arguments from
the language and text of the Constitution might seem a flimsy basis for
such sweeping choices about the scope of constitutional protection.
The ease and tenacity with which these arguments have been accepted
is partially explained by their pervasive presence in Western thought.
B. The Philosophical and Common Law Sources
The antipathy toward affirmative duties is drawn from the Anglo-
American common law. The common law in turn reenacts and is sup-
ported by the conventional strain of Western political philosophy.
Therefore, the constitutional rationales for this antipathy are profita-
bly discussed in the context of the common law and Western political
thought. This section analyzes the philosophical, political and com-
mon law roots of the conventional wisdom and the intersection among
them.
1. Philosophical Roots
The proscription against affirmative duties has an impressive line-
age. Professor Judith Shklar describes a conventional wisdom about
justice, articulated by Aristotle, and accepted by Hobbes and Kant,
which condemns only "active injustice"21 8 and "ignores the ills that
we cause by simply letting matters take their course. ' 219 However,
this ancient reluctance to condemn inaction has always been counter-
poised by an alternative way of thinking. The Platonic model of jus-
217. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 214, at 118-21; HARRIS, supra note 214 at 42-44; Michael
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughterhouse: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409, 417 (1990) (intent of framers of the fourteenth amendment
was to expand governmental power and create enforceable affirmative rights to due process and
equal protection); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
218. Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135, 1146 (1989).
219. Id. at 1142. Under this model, justice is achieved by adopting rules for distribution of
goods, and then setting up institutions to maintain those rules in the course of private exchanges
and to punish violators. Shklar refers to this as the "normal way of thinking about justice." Id.
at 1136; see also Radin, supra note 181, at 1898 n.186.
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tice developed alongside the Aristotelian, and, according to Shklar,
was transformed by Cicero from a purely philosophical to a political
conception. 220 This model viewed injustice not only as active miscon-
duct, but as indifference to wrongdoing as well.
When [the passively unjust man] sees an illegal action or a crime, he just
looks the other way. If he is a public official his offence is very grave.
He is the tyrant who condones injustice by ignoring it, or an indifferent
ruler who does nothing to mitigate and prevent the social and natural
disasters that afflict all of US. 2 2 1
Before discussing why the conventional strain has continued to
eclipse the alternative strain, it is helpful to first distinguish, as Shklar
does, the philosophical and political versions of the conventional story.
The philosophical version rests on the assumptions that individuals
are atomistic and motivated by self interest, and that the optimal soci-
ety is one in which each individual is left alone to do as he wishes so
long as he causes no harm to others.222 John Stuart Mill's often
quoted definition of liberty as the freedom to engage in self-regarding
conduct is the best known articulation of the purely individualistic
view.223 Sir Isaiah Berlin later called Mill's position the "'negative'
conception of liberty in its classical form": all coercion is bad, all non-
interference is good.224
In its political version, the conventional story makes identical as-
sumptions about the role of government. Its optimal role is noninter-
ference, or at least the smallest amount of interference necessary to
permit individuals to exercise the greatest degree of freedom without
encroaching on others.225 Berlin's essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, 226 is
perhaps the most influential explication of the distinction between pos-
itive and negative liberty and the preference for the latter. For Berlin,
a government which safeguarded negative liberty was simply one
which created no external obstacles to individual freedom, whereas a
government which sought to provide positive liberty was one which
prescribed the nature or content of that freedom. He feared that
220. Shklar, supra note 219, at 1141-47.
221. Id. at 1142-43.
222. However, as Professor Olsen explained, a very different set of assumptions informed the
"family sphere." This sphere, which was (or is) perceived as female and private, was thought to
be motivated by woman's altruism and instinct to nurture. Thus a social order based on women's
willingness to sacrifice their individual interests for the sake of male dominance of the family and
for the sake of the children was seen as merely the way of nature. Olsen, supra note 183, at 1505.
223. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (C. Shields ed. 1956) (1859); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
The Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. CI. L. REv. 752, 791 (1984).
224. I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 128.
225. See J. MILL, supra note 223, at 16-17.
226. I. BERLIN, supra note 174.
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although the impulse to positive freedom might begin benignly as an
attempt to remove internal obstacles to happiness by ensuring that
government helped citizens, citizens helped each other, and citizens
participated in government, it would eventually lead to totalitarian-
ism. The only sure way to avoid this trap was to ask of government
only that it leave its citizens alone.227 Although the definition has al-
ways engendered controversy,228 it has long exerted a powerful, even
predominant, influence on legal thought. As Professor Mark Tushnet
explained:
[The preference for negative rights reflects] fear that others ... will act
to crush our individuality.... But we also know that we need other
people to create the conditions under which we can flourish as social
beings, and thus we need positive rights. In our culture, the fear of being
crushed by others so dominates the desire for sociality that our body of
rights consists largely of negative ones.2 2 9
Although philosophers have long debated whether man's essential
nature tends toward autonomy or sociality, individualism or collectiv-
ism, the question as posed seems unanswerable. 230 A more concrete
question, which cannot be fully considered here,231 is why the individ-
ualist strain, rather than the collectivist, has, to all appearances, be-
come ascendant. In brief, scholars have credited certain historical
conditions, particularly in the eighteenth-century United States, with
providing fertile ground for individualism to flourish. Both the psy-
chology of the emerging nation and the needs of the industrial revolu-
tion contributed to its growth.
In John Dewey's words:
[I]t was an easy step from the restrictions imposed on the colonies by
Great Britain to the idea that all government by its very nature tends to
be repressive, and that the great aim in political life is to limit the en-
croachments of governments in order to make secure the liberty of
citizens. 232
The conventional wisdom sees the public sphere as something to be
227. Id. at 130-70; MACPHERSON, supra note 137, at 105-16.
228. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, supra note 190; MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76
PHIL. Rnv. 312 (1967).
229. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1392.
230. On the merits, there seems no definitive way to resolve the debate about the essence of
human nature. More to the point, the question as framed is unanswerable, because it rests on a
false duality. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, ch. VIII, at 474, reprinted in SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74 (social and individual tendencies inextricably inter-
twined). See infra text accompanying notes 248-51.
231. A detailed discussion of the historical roots of individualism is beyond both the scope of
this article and the author's expertise.
232. Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 492-93.
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feared.233 The articulated premise is the primacy of the value of indi-
vidual autonomy over societal values like cooperation, participation
and mercy. There is an equally strong, unarticulated, premise: that
individuals are on equal footing and can fend for themselves without
the assistance of government. 234 This is not to say that all people are
equally strong, quick or intelligent, but that no structural imbalances
or hierarchies exist which might require intervention. 235 If govern-
ment will simply leave us alone, and we leave each other alone, the
resulting order will be just.
The second fertile ground for individualism, according to Dewey,
was the industrial revolution.236 Certain laissez-faire doctrines were
needed to help unshackle developing industry from limits imposed by
feudal and agrarian customs. 237 It was most important to protect the
freedom to contract and to retain the fruits of one's labor. As Dewey
argues, these tenacious assumptions have long outlasted the conditions
which gave rise to them. What might have begun as a recognition that
these freedoms were needed to achieve certain immediate aims was
generalized to a belief that governmental protection of contract and
property is neutral and natural, or not government action at all. In
contrast, governmental attempts to protect other interests, such as the
right to a fair wage or job security, were viewed as political or artificial
efforts to interfere with the natural order.238
233. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1392; see also Austin, supra note 178, at 1517-18.
234. Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 494; cf Olsen, supra note 183, at 1527 (free market
ideology legitimates status quo by asserting juridical equality).
235. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MAT=ER, FORM AND POWER OF A COM-
MONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL 183 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1968) ("Nature hath
made men... equal .... [Tihe weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, at least in
confederacy with others .... ").
236. See Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 494.
237. See Olsen, supra note 183, at 1513-15. Professor Olsen traces the stages of the market,
arguing that in feudal times juridical equality was not assumed; rather, hierarchies were taken for
granted. With the rise of the free market, the rules which had governed the hierarchy, and had
also protected those on its lower rungs from the arbitrary will of their superiors, came to be seen
as impediments to liberty. The assumption of equality was needed to justify the loss of those
protections.
238. Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 490-97; see also Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 681 (1978) (noting that the nineteenth-century courts, while eschewing
imposition of some affirmative duties upon the states, "vigorously enforced the Contract Clause
against municipalities - an enforcement effort which included various forms of 'positive' relief,
such as ordering that taxes be levied and collected to discharge federal-court judgments, once a
constitutional infraction was found").
Professor Tribe recently suggested an additional source of, or metaphor for, the conventional
approach: Newtonian physics. He argues that the Newtonian view lacked an understanding
(later contributed by relativity theory and other developments in scientific thought) that objects
do not simply exist in space; they bend and shape it so that space and objects cannot be viewed as
independent from one another. Likewise, the Newtonian approach to law sees the state as a
neutral, passive backdrop to human events and fails to recoguize that the state, and the judiciary,
shape the space in which events occur. Tribe, supra note 137, at 6-13.
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2. Effects on Common Law
The effects of these philosophical assumptions on the development
of the common law are readily apparent. The common law, at least in
its early stages, assumed that we are atomistic beings, motivated by
self interest, and that it was not its function to impose on us an alien
morality.239 As Prosser commented, the early common law "had no
great difficulty in working out restraints upon the commission of af-
firmative acts of harm, but shrank from converting the courts into an
agency for forcing men to help one another."'24° The common law
paradigm is that a man may sit on a dock smoking his pipe and watch
another man drown, though he could easily throw him a rope. 241
Thus the common law's antipathy toward affirmative duties has been
called "an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, individualism." 242
The assumption of parity - that individuals are equally able to fend
for themselves - made the end result of permitting the pursuit of self
interest socially acceptable.
Even accepting as a given that people should not be legally bound
to help one another, the question remains whether government should
be legally bound to help its citizens. Two tenets of the conventional
wisdom come together to provide a negative answer to this question.
The first tenet is the conventional common law assumption of par-
ity, which the common law often employs even when one of the parties
to a transaction is the government. 243 The second tenet, the deeply
rooted fear of governmental encroachment on individual freedom,
leads to the same result as the equation of government with an individ-
ual: theoretically, a severely limited governmental role. "That gov-
ernment is best which governs least."244 Finally, the conclusion that
government should not intrude is buttressed, in the conventional
story, by assumptions about when government is or is not governing.
239. See Ames, supra note 101, at 97-103 (tracing unmoral character of early common law).
240. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 56, at 373.
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 33, § 314 comment c.
242. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 719.
243. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 226-27; Bandes, supra note 213, at 282-83.
244. This quotation is commonly ascribed to Thomas Jefferson. However, according to Ber-
gen Evans' DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 285 (1968) it reflects one strain of thought in Jeffer-
son's First Inaugural Address, but no one has ever been able to find it in Jefferson's writings.
Thoreau said it in "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience," reprinted in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 282, but in quotation marks and without noting the source. THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (3d ed. 1979) attributes it to John L. O'Sullivan in his
introduction to THE UNITED STATES MAGAZINE AND DEMOCRATIC REVIEW (1837). As Evans
says, the idea was in the air in the nineteenth century. Emerson in his Politics (1844) also said,
"[Tihe less government we have the better." R.W. EMERSON, Politics, in 3 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 199, 215 (2d ed. 1979) (1844).
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The common law-notion that government should do nothing affirma-
tive rests on the perception that government does not act when it pro-
tects certain entitlements in service of the status quo: specifically
contractual and property rights.245 Thus the philosophical ideal of
governmental inaction is achieved through the fiction that preserva-
tion of the status quo is a mere failure to act. In addition, the common
law's focus on the tangible leads to a failure to recognize that govern-
ment may act, and cause harm, through means other than intentional,
physical coercion.2 46
3. Critique of the Use of Common Law and Philosophical Sources
I do not wish to argue that the conventional philosophical and
common law positions are completely without merit. My concern is
with their influence on conventional thought about the scope of gov-
ernmental duties under the Constitution. In that context, I offer three
major criticisms of the conventional wisdom's reliance on these
sources. First, the conventional wisdom presents the individualistic
view as not merely the predominant, but the only, way of thinking
about governmental duties, and thereby ignores the insights of coun-
tervailing philosophical and common law strains. Second, it reflex-
ively adopts the assumptions of these sources even though
constitutional concerns may not be contiguous with those of political
philosophy or the common law. Third, and most fundamentally, the
conventional wisdom is based on a set of dualities which are unwork-
able. The difficulty in rebutting the conventional wisdom, which
posits a duality of negative and positive rights and exalts the former
over the latter, lies in avoiding acceptance of its terms. Claude Levi-
Strauss captured the difficulty when he said that "in attacking an ill-
founded theory the critic begins by paying it a kind of respect. '247
This leads to an inherent tension in the arguments. As a result, I ar-
gue that the conventional wisdom has adopted a myopic focus on neg-
ative rights to the exclusion of positive rights and portrayed it as the
only possible focus. But more fundamentally, I argue that the distinc-
tion is unworkable, and cannot bear the weight of the constitutional
choices courts rely on it to make.
The first issue, then, is the myopic focus of the conventional wis-
dom on individualism. The philosophical sources on which conven-
tional thought draws, such as Aristotle, Kant, and Hobbes, are
245. See Cohen, supra note 185, at 21; Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 490-91; Sunstein,
supra note 70, at 882.
246. See Macpherson, supra note 137, at 97-117.
247. CLAUDE LEvi-STRAuss, TOTEMISM 15 (R. Needham trans. 1963).
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counterpoised by an alternative philosophic stram. The individualistic
notion that liberty can be defined solely in terms of autonomy, or
"freedom from.. .,",248 and entails no positive obligations, has always
existed in tension with more collectivist notions of liberty as the free-
dom to be part of a community, participate in government and pursue
happiness.249 However strong is the hold of Mill's individualism on
current thought, few would argue that in its pure form it is a useful
model for people who live in a community.250 Political philosophers
have long argued that it does not reflect the reality of a "community
that recognizes... myriad interactions among persons and affirmative
obligations of support." 251
Likewise, the conventional wisdom about the role of government
rests on complacent acceptance of the philosophic notion that govern-
ment causes harm only by its actions, and more specifically, its tangi-
ble, intentional, physical actions. Yet this view is at odds with the
Platonic, collectivist notion that wrongful inaction, particularly by
government which is charged with preventing injustice, is as objection-
able as wrongful action.
Just as conventional thought draws selectively from philosophical
sources, so it relies on particular common law notions. The common
law, however, is not monolithic or unchanging. Many of the attitudes
which led to the charter of negative liberties are identified with the
early common law. The common law is gradually evolving from a
"formal and unmoral" state252 toward a more humane concern for the
protection of the powerless. Recently it has shown greater concern
with the public interest, 253 which has led to increasing acceptance of
248. J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 4.
249. See I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 131-71; Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism
as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IowA L. RaV. 401, 458-59 (1986); Weinreb, supra note 223, at
790-91.
250. See Weinreb, supra note 223, at 791 n.53 (citing James Stephen's comment that there is
no significant self-regarding conduct while a community is intact: "The intimate sympathy and
innumerable bonds of all kinds by which men are united, and the differences of character and
opinions by which they are distinguished, produce and must for ever produce continual struggles
between them .... ").
A more current critique of the individualist perspective has been contributed by feminist
scholars, who have identified it as a male construct, counterpoised by a female perspective which
places a higher value on interpersonal relations. Minow's article, Justice Engendered, provides a
detailed demonstration of the ways in which the male construct becomes the unstated norm. See
Minow, supra note 37, at 61 n.242 and generally; see also Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J LEGAL EDuc. 3, 8 n.16 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist
Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 618 (1990).
251. See Weinreb, supra note 223, at 791 n.53 (citing H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETH-
Ics 265 (7th ed. 1907)).
252. Ames, supra note 101, at 97.
253. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 3, at 16-17 (5th ed. 1984); 3 F. HARPER,
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affirmative duties,254 and suspicion toward rules which immunize gov-
ernment misconduct.255 Thus, reliance on the common law involves
choices: if the Court relies on common law notions which the com-
mon law itself is gradually repudiating, it must justify this choice.256
The decision to rely on the common law is itself a choice which
must be justified. The early common law was concerned largely with
enforcing contract and property rights among individuals; whereas the
Constitution is concerned largely with delineating the role of govern-
ment in relation to the individuals it governs. This is not to say that
constitutional interpretation should develop without reference to the
common law. The point is that constitutional and common law con-
cerns are often not contiguous, 257 and therefore common law attitudes
should not be adopted reflexively.258 That, for example, common law
did not recognize affirmative duties does not resolve the issue whether
the Constitution should recognize them.
In sum, the insights of political philosophy and the common law
have the power to enrich constitutional discourse, under certain condi-
tions. One condition is that the predominant strain must not be mis-
taken for a single, unanimous voice. Another is that the ultimate test
of an assumption's worth must be its fidelity to constitutional princi-
ples, not its historical pedigree.
4. Limits of the Common Law: The Failure To Recognize the
Unique Role of Government
The failure of the conventional wisdom to recognize the unique
role of government in a constitutional system exemplifies the danger of
a reflexive adoption of common law principles. The common law par-
adigm does not account for the imbalance between the "awesome
F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 718-23 (increasing tendency to find special rela-
tionships requiring affirmative duties; enterprise and strict liability; duty to complete a rescue).
254. See, eg., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 584, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
255. See, eg., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Schear v. Board of County
Commrs., 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984).
256. In response it might be argued that the relevant common law for constitutional pur-
poses is the body of law which existed at the time of the Framers. See supra discussion at text
accompanying notes 203-10.
257. See Whitman, supra note 105.
258. The belief that the Constitution is contiguous with the common law is reminiscent of
the attitude which historians argue prevailed among the Framers and through the Lochner era,
that the Constitution, like common law, was based on natural law. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,




power"259 of the government and the lesser power of the individual.26°
In addition, although the individual has an autonomy interest in being
free from coercion, it makes no sense to ascribe a similar interest to the
government. 261 Nevertheless, the common law tends to treat individ-
ual and government interchangeably when inveighing against affirma-
tive rights.262
It should be evident that government does not act like an individ-
ual, and is not on an equal footing with individuals. It is self-perpetu-
ating, it possesses massed power263 and resources, it is stratified, and it
speaks through numerous individuals, not with one voice.
These characteristics of government define the ways in which gov-
ernment can cause harm. Government harms are different from and
in many respects more serious than individually caused harms, and
these differences have important ramifications for the theory of posi-
tive and negative rights.
Government creates individual dependency on its services and re-
sources. For example, it has asserted monopoly power to protect from
crime and to enforce the laws. 264 It has the power to tax and to decide
how tax dollars are spent.265 It has monopoly control over access to
certain resources, such as highways, legal proceedings, and govern-
ment information. 266 It has displaced private alternatives and re-
quired or encouraged reliance on its own regulatory structure in
259. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
260. Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60
S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1987).
261. Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 4 (1982); see also Bandes, supra note 260, at 1026. But see Epstein, supra note
186, at 212.
262. Whitman, supra note 105, at 226; Bandes, supra note 213, at 282-83.
263. Whitman, supra note 105, at 253.
264. Government has a monopoly on "legitimate violence." Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1451.
In addition, the Court has repeatedly held that government has the sole interest in seeing that
laws are enforced. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
This monopoly power is sometimes said to arise from the terms of the social contract under
which citizens surrendered some natural rights to society in return for some protections. See
SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU (E. Barker ed. 1960). The so-
cial contract theory has given rise to arguments that the government owes its citizens a duty of
protection. See, eg., Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibil-
ity and the Right Not to Be a Victim, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 63, 75-77 (1984).
265. A series of Supreme Court decisions have established that individuals have virtually no
standing to challenge the tax expenditures of federal government. See, eg., Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
266. See, eg., U.S. Data on Abortion Censored, House Unit Says, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1989,
at A20, col. 4.
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numerous areas,267 including licensing of professionals, inspection of
buildings, food and drugs, and supervision of child welfare. In short,
it has stripped citizens of self-help remedies in numerous areas.
Government exerts substantial control over the distribution of
scarce resources. These include natural resources such as timber and
water, but also resources like government benefits 268 and wealth.269
With the control of wealth comes power over availability of jobs, the
price of commodities and access to goods and services. Government
can harm simply by withholding these resources.
Government's status as a major employer illustrates another way
in which it differs from individuals. Even when government acts as a
private individual, as landlord, employer, owner of hospitals or rail-
roads, it does so on a much grander scale. Its decisions on the training
and discipline of its employees affect not only its vast work force, but
the untold numbers of people with whom it comes into contact. Its
tremendous wealth and power enable it to place conditions on access
to its holdings which few individuals could approximate, and to cause
great hardship by its refusal of access. 270
In light of state action requirements, government is the only entity
that can violate the Constitution.271 Action which is taken under
color of law is more serious than a tort committed by an individual,
because it is an abuse of power possessed by virtue of state author-
ity.272 The opportunity for abuse is greatly exacerbated by the fact
that governmental harm often occurs on a systemic basis.273
Government, unlike an individual, is a bureaucracy. 274 This obvi-
ous fact is important in several respects. Government decisions are
267. See generally Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
268. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1295-97.
269. PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 47, 568-69 (12th ed. 1985).
270. The government's freedom to place conditions is, of course, restricted to some extent by
the Constitution. See discussion ofthe unconstitutional conditions doctrine, supra note 18, supra
notes 159-67. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972); LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9, at 686. Once government
has decided to distribute largess, it may not destroy entitlement without due process.
271. See supra text accompanying note 71. However, Congress has some power to regulate
private conduct, such as conspiracy, which interferes with the exercise of fourteenth amendment
rights. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
272. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 254-58 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). One example
of the dissonance between tort and constitutional concerns is the question of remedy. The tort
model sees money damages as sufficient compensation for its wrongs. This conclusion does not
necessarily hold true under the Constitution, which treats some harms as unacceptable, whether
or not after-the-fact damages are available. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 226.
273. See Bandes, supra note 105, at 125-27; Bandes, supra note 213, at 310.
274. See generally P. SCHUCK, supra note 65; M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:
DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
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made by a series of individuals, sometimes in different branches. 275
Government is stratified, creating classes of supervisors and subordi-
nates. The natural disincentives to act which exist in bureaucracies
exist in government as well. Finally, governmental choices, however
harmful, are more often made by the interaction of several people act-
ing in good faith than by a single malevolent person, and they are,
therefore, more likely to cause intangible harm than direct physical
damage.
The analogy between individual and government harm is not only
flawed, but pernicious. When government is treated as an individual,
the many ways in which it can cause harm are overlooked because
they do not neatly fit common law conceptions which focus on equally
placed individuals who cause or suffer tangible physical harms. 276
5. The Unhelpful Distinction Between Positive and Negative Rights
The more fundamental issue is the unworkable nature of the philo-
sophical distinctions: their inability to assist in determining what the
duties of government ought to be. Ultimately, the distinctions cannot
work because positive and negative rights, like action and inaction, or
state action and private action, are concepts which cannot be distin-
guished without a reference point, or a theory of values. In them-
selves, they tell us little which will assist in making difficult choices
about the role of government.
Negative liberty, as Mill and Berlin saw it, was easily defined and
applied. By limiting the role of government to safeguarding our right
to be left alone, it avoided the complex value judgments about individ-
ual motivations and governmental duties which a theory of positive
liberty would require.277 However, the ease of application is based on
a number of restrictive and ultimately untenable assumptions about
individuals and government.
At its most restrictive, the concept of negative liberty is based on a
Hobbesian notion of each person as an atomistic body, which goes on
moving until physically impeded by the impact of another body.278
Even in this view, government is needed to safeguard freedom from
physical intrusion. If liberty means more than a life of constant fear of
275. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
276. See discussion of the DeShaney Court's treatment of the custody issue, supra text ac-
companying notes 116-38.
277. I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 132-70; Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Lib-
erty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 179, 187 (A. Ryan ed. 1979).
278. See T. HOBBES, supra note 235, at 88; Taylor, supra note 277, at 183; C. MACPHERSON,
supra note 137, at 104; see also Tribe, supra note 137, at 7, calling this a Newtonian view.
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physical harm in which only the strongest survive, some laws are nec-
essary, and they will infringe on freedom to some degree.279 It then
becomes necessary to determine which physical intrusions will be per-
mitted,280 and whose freedom of movement will be protected at the
expense of that of others.
The Hobbesian view is thus unsuccessful even on its own terms as
a way to avoid value judgments about the role of government. But in
any case its view of people as an atomistic beings who impinge on
others' freedom only through physical coercion is crude and reduc-
tionist. Many commentators have noted that in modern society, in
which we live together in a complex web of interdependencies, virtu-
ally any act has repercussions on others and impinges on their
freedom.281
If A wishes to visit a beautiful valley, her freedom to do so, or at
least to do so in solitude, may be impeded by B's physical presence in
the valley, or even by B's threats of physical force. But her freedom
will be more effectively impeded by B's ownership of the valley. This
latter impediment derives its efficacy from the force of law, which en-
ables B to exclude others and restrict their freedom of movement and
access. 282 In the Hobbesian view, A is coerced only in the former in-
stance, yet her loss of freedom is the same in each, and in the second
instance it is attributable, not only to an individual, but to an act of
government.
In the conventional view, the government's act to protect property
and certain other well-established entitlements through its laws is not
coercive, and in fact is not an act at all.283 The ownership of property
is afait accompli, and government would act only if it tried to interfere
with it. This conception is traceable to the Aristotelian approach to
justice described by Professor Shklar, in which there must be "primary
rules settling what is due to whom, [and] there must be effective insti-
tutions to maintain the rules in the course of private exchanges and to
punish violations. When these norms are not followed there is injus-
tice, and that is all that can be said about it.'"284
Once everything is distributed, government's only duty is to main-
279. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 137, at 117.
280. Mill, for example, was troubled by the hypothetical case of a man about to walk un-
knowingly off a bridge, and questioned whether it would be permissible to grab him to prevent
him from drowning. See Weinreb, supra note 223, at 791 n.53 (1984) (citing J. MILL, supra note
223, at 17).
281. See, eg., Singer, supra note 38, at 995-97; Weinreb, supra note 223, at 790.
282. See Cohen, supra note 185, at 11-12.
283. Sunstein, supra note 70, at 886-88.
284. Shklar, supra note 219, at 1137.
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tain the status quo. When it does so, its role is perceived as passive
and noninterfering, and therefore consistent with the ideal of negative
liberty. Negative liberty, once again, is an ideal because it leaves peo-
ple free to pursue their own ends and because it keeps government out
of the realm of value choices. Yet it becomes obvious that those goals
cannot be achieved.
The initial distribution of goods and property was done according
to a value system which may or may not have been fair. The decision
to enforce the status quo, freezing the effects of the initial distribution,
is a value choice. As Morris Cohen forcefully argued sixty years ago,
the assumption that each person is entitled to keep his "own" property
is only one of many possible principles of distribution. Moreover, it is
not necessarily consistent with negative liberty's ideal of maximizing
self-regarding conduct, since few people are solely responsible for ac-
cumulating their own wealth. 28 5 Finally, in protecting the initial dis-
tribution, government is complicit in excluding others and thereby
impinging on their freedom of access. Its actions, in short, are based
on value choices about whose freedom it will protect and whose it will
obstruct.
In the conventional view, the concept of negative liberty is easy to
apply because it forbids only external (other-imposed) constraints;
whereas positive freedom also includes liberty from internal (self-im-
posed) constraints.2 6 That is, if government were responsible for en-
suring that people were not internally constrained, it would have to
make dangerous determinations about whether they were acting in
their own best interests. If government need only ensure that it does
not obstruct them, it can do so simply by doing nothing.
In fact, whether a constraint originates with government or with
the individual depends on where one draws the boundary between the
two.287 For example, although Berlin conceived of lack of education
as an internally imposed constraint, pervasive government regulation
and provision of education render this conclusion anachronistic. 288 If
it was until recently nearly impossible to gain legally recognized un-
restricted access to land in Hawaii, it was because government has
285. Cohen, supra note 185, at 15.
286. I. BERLIN, supra note 174.
287. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 5-7; Thomas Morawetz, Persons Without History:
Liberal Theory and Human Experience, 66 B.U. L. REv. 1013, 1032 (1986); Weinreb, supra note
223, at 792-93.
288. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down state law which barred illegal
aliens from attending public schools); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1




long protected the entitlements of the few at the expense of the
many,289 not because the distribution was natural, just or efficient. If
after Webster many Missouri women cannot obtain abortions because
the government has deprived their doctors of access to public hospitals
as well as to many private ones, it is because the Court has approved
the state's determination that this constraint on access to medical care
may be externally imposed. Much hinges on how the natural order is
defined.
The question, unavoidably, is what functions ought to be external
to government and what functions it ought to perform. Mechanistic
formulae about what is positive or negative, what is internal or exter-
nal, allow a pretense that this question need not be faced. It is a pre-
tense, because in the end, the formulae are empty. They have no
descriptive force, since the reality is much too complex to fit within
polar categories. The formulae are said to be devoid of normative
force: they are billed as an alternative to value choices. Thus
although they rest on a series of value choices - to condemn only
physical or tangible interference; to prefer the status quo; to protect
certain entitlements while leaving the means for satisfying others to
the vagaries of the open market - they do not justify them. In short,
they fail to describe the way things are or the way things should be. It
is a puzzle that our jurisprudence vests them with such power.
C. The Fear of Chaos: Floodgates, Slippery Slopes,
and Judicial Incapacity
My focus thus far has been on the historical antecedents which
have informed and misinformed constitutional thinking about affirma-
tive and negative duties. In this final section I explore another set of
tenaciously held beliefs which prevents clear thinking about the scope
of governmental duties.290 Broadly speaking, these arguments rest on
a common belief that once the courts recognized any affirmative du-
ties, they would lose control and chaos would reign. To state the con-
verse, the arguments begin from the assumption that by recognizing
only the negative governmental duty to avoid direct harm, courts
avoid the need for difficult decisions about motivation, causation,
duty, allocation of governmental resources, allocation of judicial re-
sources and a host of other thorny issues. Although the arguments
overlap, I consider three variations on the general theme that recogni-
tion of affirmative rights would lead to chaos. First, the floodgates and
289. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
290. These beliefs also rest to a great degree on common law and other historical assump-
tions, as I will discuss throughout this part.
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institutional competence arguments: recognition of affirmative duties
would drain scarce resources and burden the courts with nonjudicial
tasks. Second, the slippery slope argument: recognition of limited af-
firmative duties would inexorably lead to unwieldy, unenforceable and
undesirable duties as well. Finally, the difficulty of application argu-
ment: affirmative duties destroy the convenient, containable and en-
forceable pairing of rights and duties and raise difficult questions about
causation, motivation and enforcement.
1. The Floodgates and Institutional Competence Arguments
The floodgates argument, in its crudest form, expresses the fear
that if we allow this case, too many others like it will arise. It is often
paired with a more sophisticated institutional competence argument,
which is an objection not merely to the number of cases, but to the
legitimacy of judicial involvement in any cases of this type.
The nature of this objection to imposing governmental duties is
that once a court has held that government has failed to perform some
duty, for example that the police have failed to protect a citizen from a
threat of violence or the fire department has sat idly by and watched a
building burn to the ground, the court will become mired in questions
about how each government employee should do her job, will have to
allocate the resources of the various governmental agencies, and will
virtually usurp the function of the agencies themselves.2 91 Thus the
court may be doing something inherently undesirable,292 which, to
make matters worse, will dominate the court's docket and crowd out
meritorious claims. Consider the following representative language:
Should a Court ... be empowered to evaluate ... the handling of a
major fire and determine whether the hoses were properly placed and the
firemen correctly allocated? Might a Court also properly entertain a tort
claim over a school teacher's ability to teach seventh grade English or
over a postman's failure to deliver promptly an important piece of mail?
Having raised the specter of unlimited judicial duties, the court de-
scribed the feared consequences:
The creation of direct, personal accountability between each government
employee and every member of the community would effectively bring
the business of government to a speedy halt, "would dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible in the unflinching
discharge of their duties," and dispatch a new generation of litigants to
291. See, eg., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1447 (7th Cir. 1984).
292. Thus, although the argument obviously has a slippery slope aspect to it, it does not
make the "implicit concession" which, according to Professor Schauer, is the requisite of the
slippery slope: that in the instant case, as opposed to the danger case, the result would be cor-
rect. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 368-69 (1985).
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the courthouse over grievances real and imagined. An enormous
amount of public time and money would be consumed... [and] prudent
public employees would choose to leave public service.293
Courts and legislatures have long found ways to prevent this ac-
countability from coming to pass. One of the most effective ways has
been sovereign immunity. In the tort context, even where sovereign
immunity has waned, claims that government has failed to provide
services in a nonnegligent manner often founder on the public duty
rule, which states that the duty owed by government is to the public at
large, and is unenforceable by individuals. 294 Although some courts
have rejected the public duty rule as a back door form of sovereign
immunity, 295 it lives on.2 96
The stated rationale for this rule is that the question of how a gov-
ernment will allocate its resources is political, and must be left to the
discretion of elected officials. 297 This rationale is mirrored in constitu-
tional law. The assumption behind the public duty rule, that a duty
owed to many should be enforceable only at the polls, not through the
courts, is a familiar tenet of the doctrines of generalized grievance and
political question.298 With a gloss of federalism, the assumption has
been used to explain why federal courts should not require state gov-
ernment to provide competent services. 299
There is an inherent ambiguity in the floodgates argument between
the notion that every enforced public duty is undesirable, and the no-
tion that the undesirability comes from the sheer number of such
cases. To the extent the objection is to sheer numbers, it falls of its
own weight. 30° It amounts to the crudest defense of the status quo:
meritorious cases must be turned away because the courts are busy
with other cases. The argument fails because it skirts examination of
293. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. 1981) (en banc). This case rejects
a claim based on tort, not the Constitution. However, its language and concerns are representa-
tive of those in cases rejecting constitutional claims that government failed to provide adequate
services. See, e.g., Archie, 847 F.2d at 1224.
294. See, ag., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1968).
295. See, eg., Schear v. Board of County Commrs., 101 N.M. 671, 673 (1984); Riss, 240
N.E.2d at 866 (Keating, J., dissenting).
296. See Riss, 240 N.E.2d 860; Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (en
banc).
297. Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 861; Wells & Eaton, supra note 261, at 5.
298. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
299. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d at 1224; Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3053 (1989) (decision to prohibit abortion subject to public debate and approval
or disapproval at the polls).
300. I have made very similar arguments against the bar to granting standing in generalized
grievance cases. See Bandes, supra note 213, at 285-86.
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the nature of those other cases and determination of docket priorities.
The argument is crude for another reason: it erroneously assumes that
the status quo includes no cases in which government breached a duty
to its citizens. Courts inevitably review government practices which
injure citizens; the question is whether they are excluding the most
important ones.301
The more sophisticated, judicial competence, tenet of the argument
holds that the idea of judicially enforced public duty is in itself unde-
sirable. The myriad decisions by governmental officials and entities
not to provide services should not be reviewed by the judiciary. Once
the courts hold that government failed to exercise a duty, they will be
in the business of running the government. Any breach by the govern-
ment of its duties to provide services can be corrected by the political
branches.
This argument assumes that by avoiding recognition of affirmative
duties, the court is kept out of the political realm. On the contrary,
the decision not to consider whether a duty has been breached is a
decision to defer to, and ratify, the political choices government
makes. Whether that ratification is correct is unavoidably a judicial
question. As Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Marbury v.
Madison, 302 the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the
political branches, but they must determine whether those branches
are transgressing the rights of individuals. Thus whether a govern-
mental decision is discretionary or violative of protected rights is a
judicial question.303
Professor Lucinda Finley made this point forcefully in the context
of police response to domestic violence. As she noted, many of the
public duty cases, including the notorious Riss v. City of New York, 304
turned away claims by women that police failure to respond to their
requests for protection from threats of domestic violence led to their
grievous injury. The court's response that it could not force police
departments to change their priorities begged the precise question
raised: whether those priorities should be judicially ratified.305 Even-
301. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d at 588-90, 240 N.E.2d at 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d at
903-05 (Keating, J., dissenting).
302. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
303. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980) ("[A] municipality has no
'discretion' to violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative."); see
also Bandes, supra note 213, at 277-79; Davis, supra note 62, at 706 (discretion should not be
eliminated, but unnecessary discretion should); Miller supra note 20, at 225-28 (discussing indi-
vidual duties, government duties and duty of the court as national conscience).
304. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
305. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course,
1 YALE J.L. & FEM. 41, 71-72 (1989).
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tually, courts began to recognize constitutional infirmities in police de-
partment priorities, and to award damages for violation of individual
rights.306
The solicitude for discretion leads to insulation of government
practices, policies, and choices from meaningful constitutional scru-
tiny, unless they fit the conventional description of direct and tangible
harm. 307 This is a normative choice about the role of the court and
the political branches. It says that the judicial role is to defer to gov-
ernmental inaction, and thus it is a choice in favor of inaction. Given
the nature of government, the choice is dangerous: it reinforces incen-
tives which are already skewed against supervisory control over gov-
ernment employees, and encourages the unbridled discretion which
leads to unconstitutional conduct.308
2. The Slippery Slope Argument
Fear of the slippery slope is perhaps the most tenacious barrier to
the recognition of affirmative duties. Every critic of affirmative duties
invokes the slippery slope. In the philosophical realm, Berlin rejected
the notion of positive governmental duties because of the specter of
totalitarianism: once we begin allowing government to do anything
but leave us alone, we will end with it coercing us to obey its idea of
freedom. 309 In the constitutional realm, the argument is that once we
306. Id. at 72 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984)
(equal protection violated when police treat domestic violence differently, and less seriously, than
other types of crirnie)).
307. See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 918 (to leave governmental decisions to political determi-
nation spells an end to constitutionalism). An additional and complex issue is raised. Even if
government agencies should be subject to judicial oversight to ensure that they discharge their
duties, that oversight arguably can be achieved through state tort law rather than under the
Constitution. One might argue, for example, that enforcement of affirmative duties is a tort
function, whereas the sole constitutional function is to ensure that government discharges its
negative duty to cause no harm. See, eg., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1215-19 (7th
Cir. 1988). Although I do not wish to minimize the complexity of the federalism issues involved,
it seems to me that this formulation is essentially the conventional wisdom in sophisticated garb.
Once the distinction between affirmative and negative duties is seen as an untenable means of
defining constitutional protection, the important issue becomes simply what duties the Constitu-
tion mandates. If a governmental duty is mandated under the Constitution, judicial review of the
exercise of that duty is appropriate. The fact that the same duty might be mandated under state
tort law neither detracts from the existence of the constitutional duty nor renders judicial review
of its discharge any less appropriate. The distinction between the scope of tort protection and
that of constitutional protection, so often invoked to restrict constitutional duties, also works to
ensure that they are not unduly limited by the scope of tort law. See supra text accompanying
notes 259-76.
308. Davis, supra note 62, at 722; P. ScHucm, supra note 65. Of course, government discre-
tion can be controlled in numerous ways. Professor Davis suggests, in the context of police
departments, that administrative or legislative controls are the solution of choice, and that the
judiciary should step in only in the absence of action by the political branches. Davis, supra note
62, at 724.
309. I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 131; C. MACPHERSON, supra note 183, at 105-16.
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hold that due process requires the government to perform a statutorily
mandated duty to protect a known individual from threatened harm,
we will next be forcing cities to create police and fire departments and
will ultimately be guaranteeing every person a living wage and enough
to eat.310 In the tort context, a duty of easy rescue is rejected because
it would lead to forcing the wealthy to support the poor.311 The dis-
cussion of the moral or legal advisability of narrowly phrased duties,
such as the duty of a person on shore to throw a drowning child a life
preserver, invariably turns to Macaulay's hypothetical question of
whether the surgeon who refuses to go from Calcutta to Meerut to
perform a necessary operation only he can perform should be obli-
gated to do so.312
The question arises: why must we end up talking about doctors
traveling through India? This ubiquitous hypothetical is emblematic
of the slippery slope argument. The argument is that if we require
only that each person be left to her own devices and not obligated to
assist others, we need never venture into the moral thicket of motiva-
tions, morals and values. Once we say that people may sometimes
have a duty to help others, even if the inconvenience is slight and the
benefit is vast, we have intruded on personal autonomy. That is, we
have enforced beneficence at the expense of individual determination,
and thus introduced the principle which will lead to forced charity or
dangerous rescue though it causes great personal hardship. 313
Whether or not this is so, its connection to governmental duties is
not immediately obvious. Government has no liberty or autonomy in-
terests akin to those of individuals, 314 a distinction which the private
law focus of much of negative rights theory tends to obscure. 315 Nev-
ertheless, the slippery slope argument takes a similar form when the
310. See, for example, Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986), which
rejected a claim on behalf of a woman murdered after government officials ignored threats
against her by a mentally ill inmate and released him without notifying her. The court spoke of
the enormous economic consequences which would follow from the reading of the fourteenth
amendment urged by the plaintiff, which would permit myriad errors by state officials to be
found violative of the Constitution. 787 F.2d at 722-23; see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 362 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (result could lead to affirmative duties to lift handicaps
flowing from differences in economic circumstances); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980)
(same); Robert Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 699 (if a claimant can demand broadening of a welfare program, he can
demand it be started from scratch).
311. See, eg., R. EPsrEIN, supra note 43, at 61-68. But see Weinreb, supra note 41, at 272-73
(arguing that Epstein's analysis is flawed, and that a duty of easy rescue does not necessarily lead
to a general duty of charity).
312. See, eg., Ames, supra note 101, at 112.
313. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 6-63.
314. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 278.
315. Singer, supra note 38, at 982.
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government's duties are at issue. Berlin's argument against positive
rights, which is concerned specifically with the role of government, is
the seminal slippery slope argument in the philosophical context. The
argument assumes that as long as government's only duty is to leave
its citizens to their own devices, the moral thicket may be avoided.
Once government begins helping people it must make value determi-
nations about the kind of help they need, and must judge the validity
of their motivations.316 This introduces the principle which will lead
to a totalitarian society which seeks to dictate a particular view of
freedom to unwilling citizens.
The slippery slope argument as it appears in constitutional dis-
course is not well articulated, and yet it is presented as decisive.317
The argument is that the duty of government is to avoid coercing citi-
zens and to ensure that they do not coerce each other. Once it is held
that government must provide a service competently, or ensure access
to that service, it becomes a partner in coercion. In Judge Posner's
words: "To adopt these proposals [to guarantee certain services]
would change [the due process clause] from a protection against coer-
cion..., to a command that the state use its taxing power to coerce
some of its citizens to provide services to others. ' 318 This is a classic
slippery slope argument because it spends little time considering the
actual governmental duty proposed. The proposed duty, as in
DeShaney, is usually narrowly defined, and would obligate an existing
public agency to perform a specific (and often, already promised or
statutorily mandated) action on behalf of an identified individual or
class. Yet the court resolves the issue by raising the specter of
mandatory provision of goods and services. 319 The assumption is that
as long as the Constitution has nothing to say about how or whether
goods and services are provided, it has maintained a neutral stance on
the difficult moral issue of their distribution.
In sum, the slippery slope argument is that by avoiding imposition
of any affirmative duties, the judiciary can also avoid value judgments.
The argument is thus fatally flawed because it fails to see the implicit
316. See Taylor, supra note 277, at 179-81.
317. As Professor Schauer puts it, "Where do you draw the line?" is regarded as a "knock-
down argument." Schauer, supra note 292, at 380.
318. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1049 (1984). Similar arguments are made in the equal protection context. For example, Justice
Harlan's famous dissents in the Griffin-Douglas cases speak of the danger of using the equal
protection clause to "eliminate the evils of poverty." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
319. See eg., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d at 1221; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at
362 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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value choices on which it rests and the impossibility of avoiding the
question of values.
The slippery slope argument assumes that the parade of horribles
(legislated morality, forced redistribution of wealth, totalitarianism)
can be held at bay by a purely mechanical conception of liberty as the
right to be left alone by each other and by government. As Professor
Charles Taylor described it, this conception "has no place for the no-
tion of significance"; it presents itself as "purely quantitative." 320 It
tries to avoid value judgments about which interests government will
protect by positing government's role as completely passive. Yet this
in itself is a value choice in favor of individual autonomy and the sta-
tus quo as the highest values. In addition, it is unworkable even on its
own terms. As discussed earlier, no liberty or autonomy is possible
without some protection from coercion, and no society can function in
which each person is completely free to define and practice his or her
own version of liberty. Thus the courts must enforce value choices
about which interests deserve protection and which must be sacrificed;
they must give some content to the notion of protectable liberty. 321
If the courts cannot stay off the slippery slope entirely, how can
chaos be avoided? To consider this question, it is helpful to examine
the slippery slope methodology. The classic argument is that a certain
result in the case at hand would not be troublesome, but it should be
rejected because it would inevitably lead to bad results in future cases.
That is, there is no principled way to draw the line.322 As Professor
Schauer points out, the slippery slope argument contains an implicit
concession that the result would be acceptable in the instant case, but
blocks the result for fear of its application in the danger case.323
Though the instant case might be easily resolved, the slippery slope
methodology is to search for a universal rule which would also resolve
every difficult case, naturally fail to find one, and therefore decline the
acceptable solution to the instant case.
In the DeShaney case, for example, it would have been consistent
with due process for the Court to construct a narrow holding that the
state had abused its power by failing to provide statutorily required
services to the plaintiff when it had promised to do so, had notice of
his life threatening situation and had indeed contributed to that situa-
tion when it returned him to his violent home. The Court never really
explained why this result was unacceptable; it simply refused to yen-
320. Taylor, supra note 277, at 183.
321. See infra text accompanying notes 366-91.




ture from the well-defined confines of its custody exception onto the
slippery slope of requiring government services.3 24 The result was to
ratify a conception of liberty which did not include a minor's right to
protection from anticipated physical injury. Likewise, in the abortion
funding cases, the Court could have held that funding for a constitu-
tionally protected medical procedure like abortion cannot be with-
drawn in the context of a program which subsidizes all other
medically necessary procedures. The Court's refusal to do so was
based in large part on its fear of the danger case: forced funding of
abortions in the absence of any other subsidized medical care.325 The
result was to exclude from the definition of liberty the right of access
to constitutionally protected, medically necessary services.
In a sense the slippery slope is the mirror image of the Court's
baseline methodology. When determining whether the government
has caused a worsening in the plaintiff's position, the Court uses a
complete lack of government services as its point of comparison.
When determining whether it should remedy the plaintiff's harm, the
Court posits a full complement of constitutionally required govern-
ment services as the inevitable outcome. Neither a lack of services nor
required subsistence accurately describes the current world.326 Yet
the Court moves immediately to the decontextualized abstraction to
decide the actual case.
The alternative would be to decide the case before it by determin-
ing what particular justice the Constitution demands. The facility to
do this, and to draw lines between the case before it and all the cases
not before it, is the most important role of a court and an important
way in which it differs from a legislature. The paradox is that by re-
fusing to draw the line, the Court does so anyway. In DeShaney, it
drew the line at physical custody, proving that it can be drawn, but
failing to discuss whether it was drawn in the right place. More gener-
ally, in drawing the line at government inaction, the Court ensures
that government will do nothing to redress entrenched barriers to ac-
324. See infra text accompanying notes 366-91.
325. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
326. However, a full complement of government services is a much more accurate descrip-
tion of current conditions in the United States than is a complete lack of such services. In truth,
the courts' horror at the idea of required police and fire protection seems somewhat anachronis-
tic. It has been argued that government protection from harm is an essential part of the social
contract under which citizens give up their right to protect themselves. See, e.g., Edelman, supra
note 205, at 21. An argument could also be made that in the wake of the Civil War amendments,
certain minimum expectations about government protection of safety and welfare have been
shifted to the federal government and that access to such protection should not fluctuate based
on locality. Increasingly since the 1930s, these expectations have been fulfilled. Whether or not
the argument for required services could be made successfully, the threat that affirmative govern-
mental duties would lead to forced police and fire protection does not seem particularly alarming.
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cess but will instead continue to protect the injustices inherent in the
current order.
In short, for fear of the wrong result later, the Court chooses the
wrong result now, based on the mistaken belief that by preserving the
status quo it has not acted; that by choosing a rough form of justice it
has avoided the question of justice entirely. It freezes the law and
prevents it from taking account of evolving moral, social, and political
norms, assuming that by excluding these forces it has safeguarded its
fixed certainty? 27 In truth, only half the goal is achieved. The law is
fixed, but justice is too often sacrificed for want of an abstract rule.
3. The Reciprocity and Administrative Implementation Arguments
Proponents of the traditional view frequently argue that it would
be impracticable to impose affirmative duties. They reason that when
a negative duty is imposed, it is obvious when it has been breached,
who caused the breach, who suffered from it, and what the remedy
should be. If an affirmative duty were imposed, such as the duty to
protect others from harm, it would not be obvious who owes the duty
to whom, and thus it would be too difficult to enforce. 328
There are several distinct strands to this argument which bear
closer examination. First, it would be too difficult to determine who
has caused a harm which consisted of the breach of an affirmative
duty.329 Second, it would be too difficult to determine who was re-
sponsible for discharging an affirmative duty. Finally, it would be too
difficult to enforce an affirmative duty.
a. Causation. Turning first to the causation issue,330 the argu-
ment is sometimes made that, as a semantic matter, one does not cause
harm through an omission in the same way one causes harm through
an act.331 Alternatively, it is argued that although one might cause
harm through an omission, the causal connection is more difficult to
prove.332
327. See ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
182 (1982). Professor Summers argues that when judges believe they have no authority to "make
law" they are unwilling to extend a doctrine to the full extent of its moral implications or change
it in response to moral criticism. "They have viewed the law as something to be nailed down...
rather than as something that could be in [the] process of evolution." Id.
328. See, eg., Epstein, supra note 186, at 208-17.
329. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 51-53.
330. It is beyond the scope and expertise of this article to attempt a full consideration of the
complex issues of causation, on which Professor Epstein, among others, has written extensively.
See, eg., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43; Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD.
391 (1975).
331. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 51-53.
332. In the context of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), for example, the Court has
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Concededly, by pushing a nonswimmer into the water one causes a
harm, in a descriptive sense, that one does not cause by failing to
throw an already drowning person a rope. The former actor physi-
cally brought about the harm, while the latter made no physical move-
ment which contributed to the harm. As Professor Fletcher describes,
the early common law of homicide found the distinction significant,
and "tainted" those who had physically caused death without regard
to justification or excuse.333 However, since at least the nineteenth
century the common law has recognized that one may cause death
without performing a physical act.334 Modem criminal law may find a
harm which the defendant physically caused to be excusable, and may
find a harm caused by omission to be culpable. Although the notion of
physical causation still has descriptive force, it is by itself a wholly
inadequate basis for determining culpability.
In every area of law, causation is determined through a set of crite-
ria which are designed to assess culpability. Intent, fault, proximate
cause, and duty, all are legal constructs which seek to determine, from
all the possible antecedent causes of an injury, which are legally signif-
icant.335 The law is simply not coherent without some means of affix-
ing blameworthiness, apart from notions of actual cause or but-for
cause. Thus a concession that cause by action can be distinguished
from cause by omission, or even that the former is easier to demon-
strate than the latter, would not resolve the issue of whether omissions
should be actionable. As to both acts and omissions, the law must
make difficult policy determinations about which causes require the
assessment of fault.336 Difficulty of proof is simply one element in the
calculus.
In addition, it would be incorrect to concede a significant distinc-
tion between causation by acts and omissions. First, the distinction
created more stringent requirements for proof of omissions than for proof of acts. For example,
in City of Canton v. Harris, it held that to establish municipal liability for a policy of failure to
train, the plaintiffmust show a heightened state of mind: deliberate indifference, though no such
requirement exists for proof of "direct" acts. The Court justifies the heightened requirement by
reference to the difficulty of proving causation where an omission is alleged. 109 S. Ct. 1197,
1204-07 (1989); see also Michael Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns
and MunicipalAccountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 610 (1989) (defending
heightened state of mind requirement); Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to be Subjected": The
Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1225-26
(1988) (criticizing court for confusing proof of policy with causation).
333. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 5.1.1-5.1.2, at 343-50.
334. Id. at § 8.2.2, at 594 (citing Regina v. Instan, 1 Q.B. 450 (1893), which upheld a man-
slaughter conviction against a woman for letting her aged aunt die).
335. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Sig-
nificance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 93-96 (1989).
336. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 351-55, 162 N.E. 99, 103-05
(1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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will hinge on the way the activity in question is defined. In the tort
context, failure to apply brakes in a moving vehicle, or to remove a
sponge from a patient at the end of an operation, are considered negli-
gent acts, not omissions. This is because they are part of an ongoing
activity.337 In the constitutional context, all wrongful acts of govern-
ment must be evaluated in light of government's ongoing nature and
ability to cause harm by its inaction.
Second, omissions cause harm when they give rise to the breach of
a duty to act.338 A court may find that a parent caused the death of a
child by failing to feed him, but that thirty-eight onlookers did not
cause the death of Kitty Genovese by failing to come to her aid. 339
The distinction lies in the scope of duty; which must be determined
from the constitutional, statutory or common law provision which cre-
ates the duty.
In the constitutional context, it is meaningless to speak of causa-
tion without reference to the scope of particular rights. A violation of
the sixth amendment is caused by the failure to provide trial counsel to
an indigent defendant;3 40 a violation of the fourteenth amendment is
caused by a failure to provide an indigent defendant a free trial tran-
script at the appellate level.341 Did the failure of DSS to act compe-
tently cause Joshua DeShaney's injuries? The question can be
answered only by determining the scope of its duty under the due pro-
cess clause. In a legal as opposed to a semantic context, the question
of causation hinges on rights, relationships and duties: causation does
not exist in a vacuum.
b. Responsibility. A closely related argument against liability for
omissions is that it would be difficult to determine who was obligated
to compensate for the harm. In this vein, Professor Epstein argues
against affirmative duties because they would not be reciprocal. As he
describes it, the clarity of a negative duty comes from its reciprocal
nature. The reciprocal nature of negative duties is obvious: A refrains
from harming B and B refrains from harming A. A knows the identity
of the person to whom he owes a duty, and to whom he will be liable if
he breaches it. However, when a duty is positive in nature, such as the
duty to protect others from harm, the reciprocity is lost, since there is
"no single obvious neighbor, who must satisfy any particular person's
337. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 8.2, at 586-88. See text accompanying notes 46-48.
338. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 8.2, at 586-88.
339. Id. at § 8.2.3, at 601; § 8.2.4, at 605.
340. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).




One immediate response to this argument is that it assumes a
choice between perfect reciprocity and duties owed to the world at
large. It is possible to construct a duty which is owed to a discrete and
identifiable group of people. The difficulties in determining who
should be liable would be merely administrative, and no different from
any situation in which there were several tortfeasors. 343
The more significant objection, in the constitutional realm, is that
the notion of reciprocity is irrelevant to the question of governmental
duties. 344 First, the duties which flow from individuals to government
cannot be the same as those which flow the other way. Second, gov-
ernment may be obligated to prevent harm it has not caused.
The government is an inanimate object; a bureaucracy; an institu-
tion with certain powers. The Constitution gives it enumerated pow-
ers over the citizenry and then forbids it to abuse them. It cannot kill
its citizens, search them or force them to trial without certain safe-
guards. It makes no sense to speak of reciprocal obligations flowing
from citizens to government. Citizens have certain obligations to gov-
ernment, such as the duty to pay taxes 345 or serve in the military. 346
They are reciprocal only in the sense that both government and citi-
zens have some duties to each other, but the duties are not mirror
images in Epstein's sense.
But if reciprocity means only that both government and its citizens
possess some duties, then it says nothing about whether these duties
must be negative or may be affirmative. In fact, many of the individ-
ual duties are classically affirmative in nature: paying taxes, risking
life and limb in defense of country. As social contract theory suggests,
arguably the government ought to owe some affirmative duties in re-
turn. 347 If the power to tax engenders a correlative right, it is sensible
that this right is one to services, or at least to a voice in how tax money
342. Epstein, supra note 186, at 209-10.
343. Weinreb, supra note 41, at 259.
344. Epstein recognizes in passing that "[t]he shift from private lawsuit to government action
obscures the linkage between rights and correlative duties" but argues that it does not eliminate
it: "[s]omeone must still take from someone else, even if a third party mediates the transfer."
Epstein, supra note 186, at 210. The short answer is that government is perpetually taking
"something," specifically, money, from all of us and redistributing it; this is inherent in the power
to tax and spend. The question is simply to whom it is distributed. Though Epstein would argue
for constitutional restrictions on this redistribution, see Epstein, supra note 155, at 94, these
would simply freeze the status quo, itself a product of government choices about distribution.
345. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
346. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
347. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION 62-64 (J. Gough ed. 1946); J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES Bk. I, at 173-78 (G. Cole trans. rev. ed. 1973).
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is spent. If citizens have a duty to refrain from private violence, there
ought to be a correlative government duty to protect them.348
Ultimately, the nature of government's duties cannot hinge on the
nature of individual duties. Instead, both hinge on what the Constitu-
tion provides. Individuals are guaranteed certain rights under the
Constitution. Government has no correlative rights. 349 On the con-
trary, the rights granted by the Constitution are meant to protect indi-
viduals from excessive government power rather than to augment
governmental power.350 Furthermore, the duties owed by government
are often owed collectively, rendering Epstein's idea of an "obvious
neighbor" irrelevant when governmental obligations, like the duties to
refrain from unreasonable searches and seizures 351 and from denying
the equal protection of law,352 are in issue.35 3 As to these duties, no
particular individual can be identified to reciprocate, nor is there any
conceivable reciprocal duty, other than those inhering in the vague
contours of the social contract.
At bottom, if reciprocity means only that both government and
citizens possess some duties, it says nothing at all about the scope of
those duties. This is a question which must be faced on its own terms,
and which the search for neat pairings of rightholders and dutyholders
can only obscure.
c. Redistribution and enforcement. There is another, more subtle,
variation on the argument that affirmative duties would obscure the
identity of the dutyholder. Its premise is that positive rights are often
stated as "claims made against society in general" which "tend to col-
lapse into amorphous, ideal statements about the way the world
should be."' 354 Or, as Professor Robert Cover put it, to speak of a
right "is not even an intelligible principle unless we know to whom it
348. See Edelman, supra note 205, at 20-21; Black, supra note 205, at 1106.
349. See Bandes, supra note 260. Likewise the Lockean theory of natural rights assumes a
compact in which the government is obligated to the people, not they to it, and therefore "[the]
government may not properly insist upon any rights accruing to it from the people's compact."
Doernberg, "We the People':" John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Chal-
lenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52, 61 (1985); Bandes, supra note 260, at 1023 n.24.
350. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrS SERIousLY (1977); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
351. See Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 367-72; Doernberg, "The Right of the People" Rec-
onciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
259 (1983); Bandes, supra note 260, at 1048 (fourth amendment rights are collectively held).
352. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 333-34 (certain rights are not individual and alienable, but
systemic; concerned with structuring power relationships).
353. Although the Court has often held that the collective nature of rights renders them
unenforceable by individuals, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), I have argued that such rights should be enforcea-
ble by all who are harmed by their violation. See Bandes, supra note 213, at 284-87.
354. Chase, Book Review, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 304, 321 (1985) (reviewing T. CAMPBELL,
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is addressed. '355 A related premise is that even if the applicable
dutyholder is identified, it may claim an inability to discharge the
duty.356
These concerns seem particularly relevant to the broad claims for a
guaranteed subsistence income or satisfying work which are tradition-
ally the province of scholars or jurists warning about the slippery
slope. When the Court refuses to find an "affirmative" duty in a
DeShaney situation, involving a particular social service agency's duty
to a known individual, or a Webster situation, involving the scope of
an existing federal subsidy program, it is clear enough which govern-
mental agency would shoulder the obligation. If instead we talk about
the obligation to create a police department or social welfare agency,
or even to ensure a subsistence income for everyone through unspeci-
fied means, identifying the dutyholder becomes a good deal more diffi-
cult. This particular discussion, however, is not about whether some
agency somewhere ought to provide these things, but about the scope
of constitutional protection and whether it ought to include affirmative
duties. This does not solve the problem, but it does narrow it some-
what. In the constitutional context, a claim for protection or provi-
sion of services is made, not against society in general, but against the
government.
Even so, the objection is made that identifying government as the
dutyholder is problematic: government is too diffuse and affirmative
duties are too difficult to implement. Several observations can be
made about this objection. First, it is directed only to implementation
of duties which appear redistributive, not to those which appear to
enforce the status quo, although the latter may be equally difficult to
implement. Second, it is simplistic, because it fails to recognize the
numerous affirmative duties with which government routinely com-
plies. Finally, it treats the issue of defining constitutional norms as
contiguous with the issue of enforcing them.35 7 If the issue is whether
the Constitution does, or ought to, impose on the political branches a
duty to reallocate resources, the manifold problems in enforcing that
duty must be kept separate.
The argument might run that the police department has a duty not
to harm citizens physically; the public schools have a duty not to per-
THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIALIST RIGHTS (1983)
and M. GIBSON, WORKERS' RIGHTS (1983)).
355. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 65, 71 (1988).
356. Chase, supra note 354, at 321.
357. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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petuate segregation. This duty is merely a command to existing offi-
cials in existing agencies and therefore is easy to implement. However,
a duty to provide adequate police protection or schooling for the poor
and minorities would be a request for reallocation of funds, which
would not be directed to specific agencies or individuals, and therefore
would be too difficult to implement.
In this scheme, everything turns on whether government is asked
to reallocate funds or continue to implement existing programs. The
question is why this distinction ought to be of constitutional signifi-
cance. The problem seems to be mainly one of enforcement. If a court
were to determine that government could not discharge its duty to
protect and provide for its citizens without establishing new police or
school facilities, it could order that such facilities be built. It would
then be faced with the undeniably difficult task of obtaining funding
from the legislature to implement this duty and of obtaining executive
enforcement of its order. This judicial action would be different (if at
all) only in degree from the reallocations of government funds which
courts have been ordering for years. In order to implement the guar-
antees of the eighth amendment, courts have had to order that govern-
ment money be reallocated for expanded and improved prison
facilities. 358 In order to ensure equal protection of the laws for minori-
ties, courts have had to order substantial expenditures by school dis-
tricts. 359 The Supreme Court this Term reviewed judicial efforts to
enforce equal protection guarantees by ordering local governments to
build new public housing and school facilities. At issue were not the
underlying constitutional norms, but the courts' aggressive methods of
enforcement. 360
358. See, eg., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd. sub nom. Newman v. State
of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. inpartsub nor. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781,
cert. denied sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
359. See, eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S 267 (1977). In Milliken the Court upheld an
order which required state and local government to spend substantial sums of money for educa-
tional programs, including remedial reading, in order to implement a desegregation decree. The
case illustrates the often fictional nature of the distinction between preservation of the status quo
and reallocation. Since the state was a defendant, the eleventh amendment bar could be lifted
only if the relief were prospective in nature, in light of the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), that prospective injunctive relief, unlike retrospective damage relief, see Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), does not impact on the state treasury. The Court characterized the
order to spend millions of state dollars as "part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring
about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system." 433 U.S. at 290. That is, the state was
not ordered to disturb the status quo by reallocating funds it had already committed, but only to
ensure the availability of future funds. Hence Justice Rehnquist's often quoted understatement
in Edelman that "the difference between [prospective and retrospective relief ... will not in
many instances be that between day and night." 415 U.S. at 667.
360. In Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), the Court held that the district court
had abused its discretion in levying contempt citations, fines and imprisonment against individual
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It is crucial to separate the issue of identifying constitutional
norms from the problems of enforcing them. Enforcement of constitu-
tional guarantees often requires judicial oversight of government's al-
locational decisions. As the Court's conception of its role and its
remedial powers has evolved, it has become more willing to enforce
norms it once thought unenforceable. 361 That their enforcement
sometimes requires creativity is not a constitutional objection to the
underlying norms. The Court continues to express grave reservations
about upholding relief it deems too intrusive on state and local prerog-
atives. When the Court expresses these reservations by questioning
the lower courts' exercise of remedial discretion, its logic is difficult to
attack even if one disagrees with its conclusions. However, when the
Court blurs the distinction between remedial concerns and the defini-
tion of the underlying norms, its decisions lose force and clarity.362 It
may be that the Constitution contains some duties to provide basic
necessities and ensure bodily survival which are not "perfectly en-
forceable in courts of law."' 363 To deny the existence of these duties
based on current judicial reluctance or inability to enforce them is to
risk permanently sacrificing their implementation. 364
IV. THE QUESTION OF VALUES
I have argued that the conventional wisdom about affirmative
rights is based on a series of anachronistic assumptions, easy slogans
and either-or categories which impede understanding of constitutional
duties. However, the fault with the conventional wisdom is not simply
its reliance on questionable assumptions and distinctions. The crux of
the problem is that the conventional wisdom masquerades as neutral
reason, but in fact reflects extremely restrictive value choices about the
role of government. Because these choices are masked by rhetoric,
city council members who refused to comply with a court order to enact legislation required by a
consent decree to fund public housing. It upheld contempt citations and fines against the city
itself. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), the Court struck down on comity grounds
a district court order imposing an increase on the amount of property taxes levied by a school
district to fund public school desegregation, but held that federal courts may require the school
districts themselves to levy taxes in order to fund desegregation.
361. Compare Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (malapportionment nonjusticiable be-
cause beyond judicial competence) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (courts can enforce
voter franchise through injunctive remedies); see also Bandes, supra note 213, at 304 n.530.
362. See, for example, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), in which the Court
denied article III standing based on asserted lack of requisites for injunctive relief. For criticism
of the decision as blurring the distinction between justiciability and remedial concerns, see Rich-
ard Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 22-35 (1984).
363. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 15-9, at 1337.
364. See Sager, supra note 357, at 1221.
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they are never fully articulated. It is not the inevitable failure to attain
neutral reason, but the pretense, that is dangerous. The slogans and
categories encourage the complacent notion that the restrictive results
they yield are inevitable.3 65 In fact, the results reflect choices which
must be judged on the merits.
The conventional approach to defining constitutional duties claims
to avoid the need to give content to the abstract principles of liberty
and equality by simply commanding government to do nothing at all.
Yet through this command it gives content to these principles. Lib-
erty is defined as governmental noninterference, and thus government
becomes complicit in preserving the current distribution of goods,
services, and entitlements. Equality is defined as the freedom to com-
pete against others in the marketplace, even for those things the Con-
stitution guarantees.
To the extent that these principles lead to injustice and inequality,
the conventional wisdom is that these are the unfortunate but unavoid-
able result of private, individual forces. Yet the distinction between
public and private limits, or internal and external constraints, is of
little use in determining whether one's loss of liberty is attributable to
the government. At best, it is a description of the status quo, and says
nothing about the way things ought to be. The inability to afford med-
ical care or infant formula or to obtain a basic education is attributable
to private action or individual limitations only to the extent there is no
governmental obligation to provide these things. The line between
public and private spheres of influence is not immutable.3 66 This is not
to suggest that the scope of governmental obligation is without inher-
ent limits. The limits are in the Constitution, but the Constitution
cannot be interpreted without reference to values.
For example, in DeShaney and Webster the Court's conclusion
that the plaintiffs' plight was private and individual - that the gov-
ernment did not act to worsen the position of the injured parties -
assumed a baseline of a complete lack of government services. This
365. See Minow, supra note 37, at 35: "[T]hese patterns of legal analysis [which focus on
categorization] imply that legal reasoning yields results of its own accord, beyond human
control."
366. The Webster opinion illustrates this point with an ironic twist. It upheld a statute under
which even private doctors who perform abortions on private patients paying for services with
private funds will be affected if their admission privileges are at a medical facility which leases or
rents equipment or land from governmental entities. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.200(2) (1986);
ACLU/REPRODUcTIvE FREEDOM PROJECT, supra note 176, at 7, 25. Thus it adopts an expan-
sive definition of the public realm, not in order to impose expanded governmental duties, but to




baseline could not be justified as descriptive of the status quo.367 Even
if it had been, its use would have been a choice to use the status quo as
a standard.368 Ultimately, the baseline becomes normative: it adopts
government inaction as the standard against which all its conduct is
measured; the way things are as the way they should be.
The choice of baseline cannot be made value-free. 369 The unavoid-
able issue is what we ought to expect from government. If the answer
is nothing at all, that we are lucky not to be living a nasty, brutish, and
short life,370 then anything government decides to give will be largess,
and it can decide to give nothing for any reason at all. If the answer is
minimal subsistence, or reasonably competent services, the govern-
ment's burden is substantially greater.
How should the scope of constitutional duty be determined?
Whether government has an affirmative duty will depend in large part
on the requisites of the particular constitutional provision at issue.
Whether or not those requisites will prove determinative, they must at
least provide the initial focus of the inquiry.
The trial-related rights, for example, reflect a recognition that un-
less a trial is accompanied by certain affirmative guarantees, such as
the right to counsel and compulsory process, the core sixth amend-
ment promise of a fair (speedy, public, impartial) trial becomes a nul-
lity.37 1 The equal protection clause is concerned with the hazards of
inequality and discriminatory treatment.372 To avoid both these
hazards and the imposition of unequal burdens on independently pro-
tected rights, it must sometimes impose an affirmative duty on govern-
ment to provide access, for example to judicial services,373 to public
fora,374 and to the voting franchise. 375 The due process guarantee of
procedural regularity holds that in order to guard against the danger
of arbitrary government action, government is charged with an affirm-
367. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94; 168-75.
368. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1359-63 (discussing use of history or status quo as a
baseline).
369. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1450 n.150 (criticizing Kreimer's three suggested base-
lines as importing unstated normative theories).
370. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1357 (discussing use of Hobbesian state of nature as a
baseline).
371. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (counsel);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial).
372. Michelman, supra note 20, at 9.
373. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
374. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
375. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll
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ative obligation to provide a hearing before depriving individuals of
life, liberty, or property.3 76
The conventional wisdom stubbornly explains all such examples as
exceptions which prove the rule,377 but, more accurately, the excep-
tions which riddle the rule of negative rights are evidence of its irrele-
vance. In its insistence on categorizing and then dismissing whole
categories of government obligation,3 78 the rule obscures the correct
focus of constitutional discourse: the requisites of the Constitution.
Certain constitutional commands cannot be met without an affirma-
tive effort by the government.
However, identifying the Constitution as the correct focus of the
inquiry is not the same as resolving the inquiry. The constitutional
text is only a starting point. Particularly as to the open-textured pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, their
scope cannot be determined without reference to substantive values.379
The sixth amendment's comparatively straightforward guarantee
of the right to counsel, for example, leaves for interpretation the ques-
tion of whether the government must provide such counsel free of
charge.380 The Court's winding path to its eventual conclusion in
favor of appointed counsel evidences the necessity, and the difficulty,
of giving content to the guarantees of counsel and a fair trial.
The spare language of the equal protection clause raises issues
which have proved more intractable. It is necessary to identify the
objectionable inequalities,381 and how to correct them. If equal pro-
tection were merely a command to treat all persons the same, it would
lead to a burdening of rights in many instances. In some contexts,
equal protection involves treating differently placed people differ-
ently.3 82 The ideal of equality is "empty" unless it is given substantive
376. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
377. Currie, supra note 28, at 873-74; supra text accompanying note 27.
378. See Chase, supra note 354 (distinction between positive and negative rights is used un-
necessarily to subordinate the former to the latter).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
380. The right to appointed counsel was first recognized in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), and then only under extremely narrow circumstances. In fact, Powell was a fourteenth
amendment case premised on fundamental fairness guarantees. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), found a right to appointed counsel in the sixth amendment in federal cases. It was not
extended to the states until 1963. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
381. See Michelman, supra note 20; Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1367.
382. Minow, supra note 37, at 22-25; Michelman, supra note 20; see also L. TRIBE, supra note
51, § 16-1, at 1437-38 (discussion of the difference between equal treatment (all persons have
same access) and treatment as an equal (all persons treated with equal regard, though this means
taking cognizance of their differences)). One of the most intractable equal protection questions is
the treatment of poverty. For example, the Griffin-Douglas principle holds that to some extent




The due process guarantee has proved similarly opaque. The guar-
antee is directed at the arbitrary use of governmental power.38 4 It is
impossible to give meaning to the guarantee without a notion of the
proper uses of that power. The Court has avoided the issue by reliance
on a series of bright lines: only intentional, 385 direct,3 8 6 and coer-
cive387 acts may cause deprivations. Application of these bright lines
has led to unjust results because they are too coarse to capture the
complex ways in which government can abuse power.388 The Court
never explained why the state's disastrous incompetence in DeShaney
did not offend deeply held notions about governmental obligations to-
ward defenseless children which ought to be imbedded in the Consti-
tution.389 Likewise it would have been consistent with due process
notions to hold that the deliberately skewed subsidies in Webster im-
permissibly burdened privacy rights in contravention of Roe v.
Wade. 390 The Court is discomfited by the amorphous quality of the
due-process clause, and reacts by treating it restrictively. This reaction
does not succeed in freeing due process jurisprudence of value choices;
it is a choice in itself. Because it is justified only by reliance on easy
slogans, it is in danger of appearing as arbitrary as the very action the
clause condemns.
Ultimately, the objections to affirmative rights are based on a vi-
sion of the Constitution as a negative document which prevents gov-
ernment and citizens alike from harming one another by force. A
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But later cases
made clear that this obligation is, as Tribe said, not a guarantee of equal access to criminal
justice, but of minimal access. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 16-52, at 1653; see Murray v. Giar-
ratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (state not required to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seek-
ing collateral review); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (same in death penalty
context); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state not required to appoint counsel for indigent
prisoners seeking discretionary appellate review). The poverty cases illustrate the point that the
equal protection guarantee is unavoidably interpreted in light of choices about which services
and commodities must be protected from the workings of the free market. See Radin, supra note
181, at 1903.
383. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MIcH.
L. REv. 575 (1983); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982).
384. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
385. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
386. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006-07
(1989).
387. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3052-53 (1989).
388. See Bandes, supra note 105, at 125-27; see also Burnham, supra note 215, 550-70, (ad-
vancing a definition of the abuse of power prohibited by the due process clause).
389. See, eg., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987); Estate of Bailey by
Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985); Aristotle P. v. Johnson & Morgan, 721 F.
Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
390. See Perry, supra note 155; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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more appealing vision would recognize that just as we are inextricably
bound to each other, we are dependent on government to preserve our
liberty by providing certain things we require and expect, and that
these things must be singled out for constitutional protection. The
identification of the things we require and expect, as a constitutional
matter, is crucial. The Court has concerned itself with the elusive and
ultimately irrelevant distinction between "freedom from and freedom
to. g3 9 1 The question that should be asked instead is: what must we
have in order to be free?
391. I. BERLIN, supra note 174; J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 27.
